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INTRODUCTION
Human beings who have experienced traumatic events often seek to
suppress memories of those events and deny the continuing effects of this
trauma. But, as a wise American wrote nearly a century ago, "Those who
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."' This article
examines one aspect of our collective denial regarding the trauma of slavery,
which nearly destroyed our nation in the nineteenth century. We have failed
to embrace the historical context surrounding adoption of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, and, consequently, we have not given effect to its central
purpose: to constitutionalize federal habeas corpus review of race-based
incarcerations. This failure, in turn, has resulted in unconstitutional statutes
and judicially crafted rules that protect states against claims that they have
denied citizens their liberty based upon impermissible consideration of race,
thereby condemning us to repeat our history of race-based incarcerations.
In his groundbreaking work, The Bill of Rights: Creation and
Reconstruction,2 Akhil Reed Amar challenged future scholars to scrutinize
the largely unexamined nineteenth-century Freedman's Bureau habeas
corpus and Freedman's Bureau records This article is, in part, a response to
* Associate Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law, J.D. Yale Law
School, B.A. Pennsylvania State University. I would like to thank the following people for
agreeing to read and comment upon this article: Prof. Thomas Berg, Dean Thomas Mengler,
Prof. Michael Paulsen, Prof. Celia M. Rumann, and Bryan A. Stevenson. I would also like to
thank Jed Iverson for his extraordinary research assistance.
1 1 GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON, OR THi PHASES OF HuMAN PROGRESS,
284 (2d ed. 1936). This maxim of the great American philosopher George Santayana has
been so ofien quoted, misquoted, and paraphrased that it may seem to lack contemporary
relevance. However, its use, perhaps even overuse, is more a recognition of its continuing
vitality, rather than its triteness.
2 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
3 Id. at 303-04.
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that challenge. These and other sources cited in this article make one point
clear: the debate between and among Professor Amar, Raoul Berger, and
other scholars concerning the original intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot be resolved through recourse to traditionally constrained
examinations of legislative debates and textual deconstruction. These
methods are useful to a point, but ambiguity remains. This ambiguity can
only be resolved by examining the history of the amendment and its various
clauses in light of the great political and social forces shaping our nation at
that critical juncture. When the Privileges or Immunities Clause is so
examined, it is clear that the clause was intended primarily to
constitutionalize federal habeas corpus review of claims that states were
denying individuals their liberty based upon race. From this often-ignored
history, this article will also conclude that some statutes, such as the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), and
judicial doctrines purporting to allow states to default such race-based
claims are themselves unconstitutional. 5
This article examines the unique role that race has played in our
constitutional history, particularly in the intersecting histories of federalism,
habeas corpus, and the Fourteenth Amendment. This history, reflected in the
surviving court records of habeas proceedings, challenges much of the
conventional wisdom surrounding habeas corpus.6 This article will focus
specifically on the complex relationship between principles of federalism
and a state's ability to shield from federal habeas corpus review its decisions
to incarcerate individuals in a manner consistent with state law that,
nevertheless, are alleged to be based upon impermissible considerations of
race.
Section I provides a brief history of habeas corpus and its unique role in
defining the federalism balance. Section II details the effect of the Civil War
4 The provisions of the AEDPA are codified in various places in the United States
Code. Those relating to federal habeas corpus for state-court prisoners upon which this
article will focus are the amended provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2261 (1996) for capital cases.
5 Moreover, modem Supreme Court pronouncements limiting the Suspension Clause's
application to federal prisoners are incorrect, for the Privileges or Immunities Clause
extended the Suspension Clause's reach to federal habeas jurisdiction over claims that a
prisoner's liberty has been deprived due to considerations of race. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly indicated that the Suspension Clause applies only to the federal writ sought on
behalf of federal prisoners, and Congress may, therefore, abrogate this right as it applies to
state prisoners. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651,659-61 (1996); McCleskey v. Zant,
499 U.S. 467, 477-78 (1991); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1976).
6 One of the conventional beliefs challenged by these records concerns the scope of
relief available under the writ prior to 1867, particularly its availability to litigate claims of
actual innocence. Those particular issues will be reserved for future writings.
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and the adoption of the Civil War Amendments upon the distribution of
power between the national government and the several states. This section
will focus specifically on the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or
Immunities Clause and its relationship to habeas corpus and the protection of
newly freed slaves. Section III examines the resurrection of antebellum
notions of federalism and their effect on habeas corpus review of state-court
convictions. This section will analyze the constitutionality of provisions of
the AEDPA, along with some judicially crafted rules of preclusion, and
briefly discuss the persistence of race-based problems in our society at large
and the role these problems play in decisions to incarcerate. Section IV will
demonstrate the unconstitutionality of legislation (including the analyzed
provisions of the AEDPA) or court-adopted rules (such as adequate and
independent state-court grounds for denying relief) that purport to deny
federal court jurisdiction to hear claims predicated upon race-based
deprivation of liberty.
I. FEDERALISM, SLAVERY, AND HABEAS CORPUS
Our Constitution is properly regarded as one of the most brilliantly
conceived political documents in history.7 Its conception, however, was
tainted by its explicit acceptance of racial bias in one of its most abhorrent
forms. 8 The "temporary" acceptance of slavery by the Constitution cemented
within our principle founding document state-sanctioned deprivations of
liberty that were based solely upon race. 9 These slavery provisions were
7 See, e.g., CAROL BERKIN, A BRILLIANT SOLUTION: INVENTING THE AMERICAN
CONSTrrUTION (2002).
8 There are four provisions in the original Constitution that reference slavery. The U.S.
Constitution, art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (the so-called "Three-Fifths Clause") counted each slave as
worth three-fifths of a person for purposes of apportioning taxes and representation in the
House. Article I, § 9, cl. I forbade Congress from prohibiting importation of slaves before
1808. Article IV, § 2, cl. 3, the "Fugitive Slave Clause," explicitly prevented free states from
interfering with the property rights of slave owners in their slaves. Article V forbade
amendment of the Constitution to effect importation of slaves or capitation tax before 1808.
Some historians include additional provisions of the Constitution among those pertaining to
slavery. See, e.g., HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 89-90 (1982).
9 While these provisions do not specifically reference race, they incorporated slavery
into the structure of the Constitution. Slavery, as practiced in the states at this time, was
indisputably based upon race. The explicit recognition of ra6e as the basis for slavery, which
is found in many state laws in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was explicitly
acknowledged in the Constitution only through the Civil War Amendments. See, for
example, Virginia Slave Law, December 1662:
Whereas some doubts have arisen whether children got by any Englishman
upon a Negro woman should be slave or free, be it therefore enacted and declared
by this present GrandAssembly, that all children bom in this country shall be held
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controversial from their inception. ° Strong disagreement existed as to
whether the slavery provisions were wise or moral." To understand how
these provisions came to be included in the Constitution and the lengthy
battle for their removal, one must examine them within the federalism
context in which they find their expression. State-sanctioned slavery,
abhorrent to many even in the late eighteenth century, 12 was tolerably
enshrined in the Constitution as an expression of states' rights.' 3 The
provisions of the Constitution that concern slavery are expressions of the
federalist principle that the various states would be free to enact laws of their
choosing without interference from the national government or other states. '
4
To note that the state-sanctioned deprivation of African slaves' liberty
enshrined in our Constitution was an issue of federalism is to state the
obvious. 5 These two issues, federalism and enslavement due to race,
bond or free only according to the condition of the mother; and that if any
Christian shall commit fornication with a Negro man or woman, he or she so
offending shall pay double the fines imposed by the former act.
I I WILLIAM WALLER HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF
VIRGINIA 170 (Richmond, Va. 1809-23), available at http://www.usconstitution.com/
VirginiaSlaveLaws 1660s.htm. Pennsylvania's altruistic laws also demonstrate
[t]hat all persons, as well Negroes and Mulattoes as others, who shall be born
within this State from and after the passing of this act, shall not be deemed and
considered as servants for life, or slaves; and that all servitude for life, or slavery
of children, in consequence of the slavery of their mothers, in the case of all
children born within this state, from and after the passing of this act as aforesaid,
shall be, and hereby is utterly taken away, extinguished and for ever abolished.
An Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery (Penn. 1780), available at http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalonlstates/statutes/pennst01 .htm.
10 See, e.g., A. LEON HIGcINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 377-89 (1978).
1 Ild.; see also 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 481-93 (Max
Farrand ed., 1966).12 See, e.g., Benjamin Franklin, Address to the Public from the Pennsylvania Society for
promoting the Abolition of Slavery, and the Relief of Free Negroes, unlawfully held in
Bondage (Nov. 9, 1789) available at http://www.usconstitution.com/AddresstoPublic
ConcemingSlaveryBenFranklin.htm. ("Slavery is such an atrocious debasement of human
nature, that its very extirpation, if not performed with solicitous care, may sometimes open
a source of serious evils.").
13 Michael P. Mills, Slave Laws in Mississippi From 1817-1861: Constitutions, Codes
& Cases, 71 Miss. L.J. 153 (2001).
14 See supra note 8. Article I, § 9, cl. 1 and Article V concerned the distribution of
power between the states and the national government, while Article IV, § 2, cl. 3 concerned
the ability of one state to enforce its laws without interference from other states. Article I,
§ 2, cl. 3 concerned representation in the House of Representatives.
15 Of course, Article I, § 9 reflected a compromise position among the pro- and anti-
slavery forces concerning the ability of the federal government to limit the importation of
slaves into any particular state. The time limitation found in section nine is unique among
2004-20051
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combined to trouble this nation like no other. Pro-slavery and abolitionist
forces fought their battles on a field whose boundaries were defined by
federalism. While the Civil War was the most dramatic and bloody
expression of the conflict, it was by no means the only way in which this
battle was fought. The most common legal tool used to fight this battle16 was
the writ of habeas corpus. 7 Both sides used the writ to their advantage, 1 but
the principle use of the writ in this context was to define the limits of
national and state power within the federal system.19
The role of habeas corpus in giving contour to the form of federalism did
not end with the onset of the Civil War. That war was fought to redefine the
federalism balance, at least insofar as a state's ability to secede from the
Union and to deprive a person of liberty based upon race. 20 Following the
surrender of the rebel forces at Appomattox, the states ratified the Thirteenth
Amendment. 21 Congress followed this by passing the Civil Rights Act of1866.22 The following year, Congress amended both the Habeas Corpus Act
those provisions of Article I that seek to limit the scope of federal power. The Framers
intended to leave for the future the precise distribution of power concerning a state's ability
to import slaves within the federal system. It is this federalism dynamic as it relates to race-
based deprivations of liberty that is at the heart of this article.
16 Of course, the legal battle was not the only one fought. Slavery was appropriately
contested as a moral and political issue as well. See generally HIGGBTOTmAM, supra note 10.
17 See, e.g., Habeas Corpus Case Records, 1820-1863, of the U.S. Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia, 1820-1863, microfilm publication M434, Roll 2 (Nat'l Archives &
Records Serv., Gen. Servs. Admin., Washington, D.C. 1963); Records of the U.S. Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia Relating to Slaves, 1851 1863, microfilm publication
M433, (Nat'l Archives & Records Serv., Gen. Servs. Admin., Washington, D.C. 1963); see
also Marc M. Arkin, The Ghost at the Banquet: Slavery, Federalism, and Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 70 TuL. L. REV. 1 (1995).
is For an illuminating discussion of the sometimes surprising uses of the writ in this
context, see Arkin, Ghost at the Banquet, supra note 17. Abolitionist forces frequently used
the writ to secure the release of fugitive slaves, while slave owners used the writ to secure
the release of individuals arrested while seeking to return escaped slaves to slave owners. Id
at 33-41.
19 See Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39
UCLA L. REV. 503, 562-63 (1992).
20 While some scholars debate whether the Civil War was fought over slavery or states'
rights, see Sheryl G. Snyder, A -Comment on the Litigation Strategy, Judicial Politics and
Political Context which Produced Grutter and Gratz, 92 KY. L.J. 241, 242-43 (2003), it
cannot be rationally argued that the federalism dispute was brought to the point of war over
whether states could merely secede from the union rather than submit to national policies
antithetical to state-sanctioned slavery. See infra Part II.A. 1.
21 "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CoNs-r. amend. XIII, § I. Ratification by the requisite
number of states occurred on December 18, 1865, eight months following the surrender at
Appomattox.
22 Civil Rights Act of 1866, eh. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
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and the Judiciary Act23 and passed the Reconstruction Act of 1867.24 The
effect of these legislative acts was to expand federal court review of state-
court decisions to imprison individuals and to mandate that all states in
rebellion ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. 25 That amendment was ratified
the following year, constitutionalizing the expansion of federal habeas
corpus review to state-court incarcerations allegedly based upon race.26 The
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, like the original constitutional
provisions concerning slavery, are inextricably tied to issues of federalism
and designed to reorder the federalism balance regarding a state's ability to
oppress persons due to their race.
Because these amendments cannot be properly understood without
reference to their history, their application today should never be completely
divorced from their original purpose. In recent years, under the banner of
"federalism," our courts and political leaders alike have ignored the original
intent of the Civil War Amendments generally and the Fourteenth
Amendment particularly. This reversion to conceptions of federalism
espoused at the time of the adoption of the original Constitution represents
an unconscionable desecration of one of the most costly and hallowed
principles this nation has ever embraced.
Like the antebellum battle over slavery, this revisionist battle has also
been fought with the writ of habeas corpus. Through the use of "adequate
and independent" state-court grounds for denying relief, statutory and court-
adopted limitations upon federal habeas corpus currently permit a state to
abridge the writ and shield deprivations of liberty based upon race from
federal review, so long as state procedural rules sanction such incar-
cerations2 7
For the most part, the scholarly debate over the Privileges or Immunities
Clause has tracked the earlier debate concerning the Due Process Clause.28
The arguments have focused on the extent to which, if at all, the Privileges
or Immunities Clause was intended to "incorporate" the Bill of Rights,
§ 1981 (1991)).
23 Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385; Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 2,
14 Stat. 385.
24 Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428.
25 Id.; Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385; see also Henry L. Chambers,
Jr., Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51 EMORY L.J. 1397 (2002).
26 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).
28 See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: Akhil Amar 's Wishing
Well, 62 U. CRN. L. REv. 1 (1993); Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1197 (1992).
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29thereby making 'those provisions applicable against the states. Some argue
that the clause incorporated the Bill 6f.Rights wholesale.30 Others maintain
that none of these amendments were meant to apply to the states.3' More
recently, Professor Akhil. Reed Amar has argued for "refined
incorporation."3 2
This debate has been largely academic because, in the Slaughter-House
Cases,3 the Supreme Court defeimined that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause 'incorporated 'none of these amendments against the states.
Nevertheless, the arguments have been heated, with positions so strongly
staked out that those involved have overlooked the importance of two points
commonly espoiused'by most commentators and every justice who decided
the Slaughter-House Cases: 1) the primary purpose of the amendment-was
the protection of freed slaves; and 2) habeas corpus was one of the privileges
or immunities of federal citizenship that the states were forbidden to abridge.
Lost in the incorporation debate is the fact that the very essence of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was not rendered a nullity by Slaughter-
House. The, Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended to constitu-
tionalize federal habeas corpus review of any state attempts to deprive an
individual of liberty based upon race. On this narrow issue, this article
submits that the federalism balance was indisputably meant to change in
response to this amendment Recent attempts to revert to antebellum notions
of federalism, permitting states to procedurally default a claimant's access to
federal habeas corpus review of any claim of race-based deprivation of
liberty, offend the Privileges or Immunities Clause and therefore are
unconstitutional. 4
A. Origins and Development of the Privilege
At its most fundamental, the writ of habeas corpus is a device used to
define the structural boundaries of power between and among competing
divisions of government. The writ has properly been described as "the
traditional common-law weapon in intragovemmental warfare. 35 From its
inception, habeas corpus has been a tool that permitted the empowered agent
(usually a judicial officer) to order the release or transfer of an individual
29 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 28; Amar, supra note 28.
30 See David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views of the Case, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 333
(2003).
31 See Berger, supra note 28.
32 See Amar, supra note 28; AMAR, supra note 2.
83 U.S. 36 (1872).
14 While strong arguments are made that the balance of federalism was intended to shift
to a broader range of issues, that subject is beyond the scope of this article.
35 Arkin, Ghost at the Banquet, supra note 17, at 41.
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who was being held in custody by another agent of government (usually a
judicial or executive officer).36 The writ originated in the common law as a
method through which the King's Bench established primacy over lesser
courts and quasi-judicial consular bodies.37 The supremacy of the King's
Bench over the Court of Requests, the Court of Admiralty, and the Court of
High Commission was eventually realized in part through the use of habeas
corpus, which permitted the King's Bench to act as a check on the
jurisdiction of those rival courts.38 Later, during the seventeenth century, the
writ took on its more familiar character as a judicial protection against unjust
incarceration at the hands of the executive. 39 Through the centuries, the
development of the writ has altered its scope and application but not its
fundamental role in defining the power relationships between divisions or
branches of government.
The great debates about habeas corpus have essentially concerned the
distribution of political power. Without demeaning the individual's stake in
proceedings under the "Great Writ of Liberty,"40 the determination of
whether vindication of this liberty interest will be available has always been
inextricably bound up in structural battles over the properrepository of and
limitations on political authority. Frequently, the battle to decide this
political distribution was fought by "recourse to the ancient weapon in
intragovernmental squabbles: the writ of habeas corpus."'41 Over the course
of centuries, concern for individual liberty has sometimes been deemed
subservient to the political distribution question and sometimes been placed
on equal footing with it, but the two questions have never been separated.
They cannot be distilled from one another because they are of one element,
not separate parts of a compound. In no era has this elemental connection
been more apparent than during the great struggle over slavery that spanned
most of this nation's first century.
36 See id at 1-7; see also Michael O'Neil, On Reforming the Federal Writ of Habeas
Corpus, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1493, 1496 (1996).
37 See Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of
Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 970-71 (1998); Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Untold Story of
Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996 Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2521
(1998). -
35 See Neuman, supra note 37, at 970-71; Hafetz, supra note 37, at 2521.
39 See Neuman, supra note 37, at 971.
4o The writ of habeas corpus is often referred to as "the Great Writ of Liberty" by both
academics and courts alike. See, e.g., ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE
GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY (2002); see also Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 148 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J., writing separately).
41 Arkin, Ghost at the Banquet, supra note 17, at 33.
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B. Slavery, Antebellum Notions of Federalism, and Habeas Corpus
Slavery weakened the moral foundations of this nation long before the
nation itself existed. Slavery's impact, however, was not confined to the
moral sphere. Had it been so contained, reason and moral discourse might
have eliminated this scourge at a much earlier time.42 Economic benefits
derived from the slave trade and subsequent reliance upon forced labor
created a powerful incentive to reject calls for abolition.43 Slavery would
prove to be the strongest strand in a thread of southern economic interests
that, when woven together with the political self-interests inherent in a
federalist system, created a rope powerful enough to bind this nation to a
destiny of conflict, rebellion, and civil war. The manner in which this rope
was braided is of critical importance in adequately understanding the original
intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. In particular, we must
examine how slavery and antebellum notions of federalism were interwoven
to comprehend the manner in which the struggle over slavery was fought, the
importance of habeas corpus to that struggle, and the way the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to alter the federalism balance.
1. Slavery and Federalism under the Original Constitution
The "peculiar institution" of slavery was established long before the
Constitutional Convention ("the Convention") opened in Philadelphia on
May 25, 1787. 44 Slaves were forcibly brought to the Americas as early as
1619.4 5 By the time of the Convention, an estimated 600,000 people of
African descent were enslaved in the lands governed under the existing
42 Certainly there was no shortage of early discourse on the morality of African
enslavement. See DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE
(1988); see also DAVID BRION DAVIS, IN THE IMAGE OF GOD: RELIGION, MORAL VALUES, AND
OUR HERITAGE OF SLAVERY (2002).
43 See generally ROBERT W. FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE
ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (W. W. Norton 1995) (1974), for a discussion of
slavery as providing an economic foundation for this country and the insidious effects this
exploitative origin have had on subsequent developments in U.S. history. See also Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (identifying the perceived economic necessity for
slave labor in the South and the essential role the compromise over slavery played in the
drafting and ratification of the Constitution). But see THOMAs DILORENZO, THE REAL
LINCOLN (2002).
44 See The U.S. Constitution Online, The Convention Timeline, available at
http://www. usconstitution.net/consttime2.html.45 See e.g., Martha L. Wharton, A Peculiar Institution: A Primer on American Slavery,
at http://www.thenorthstarnetwork.com/news/hefitage/l 81507-1 .html (last visited May 22,
2005).
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Articles of Confederation.4 6 It is safe to say that no consensus existed among
the delegates to the Convention as to either the wisdom or morality of
permitting slavery under the constitutional form of government proposed.47
Disagreement over slavery threatened to undermine any chance for a
governmental system with a national authority possessing more than the
nominal powers granted under the Articles of Confederation. 8
The Convention debates highlight how slavery was enmeshed within the
structure of our government from its intellectual conception.49 Compromises
made between pro-slavery and abolitionist factions at the Convention would
bind the structural divisions of power under our Constitution with the locus
of authority to determine the lawfulness of race-based deprivations of
liberty. Although the origins of federalism as a political theory have more
noble roots50 and its advocates in this nation's history have in large measure
been motivated by purer things,51 slavery, upon ratification of the
Constitution, became permanently rooted in the debate over the proper
distribution of power in a federal system of government.
The nature of the compromise reached at the Convention involved slave
states ceding to Congress the authority to forbid importation of slaves
46 Approximately 575,000 slaves resided in the United States in 1781. Africans in
America, Part 3, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part3/map3.html (last visited
Mar. 22, 2005).
47 See, e.g., HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 8, at 89.
41 Id. at 89, 117-18. For the most thorough contemporaneous reproduction of the role
of slavery in the debates of the Constitutional Convention, see 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 366-77 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). See also Prigg, 41 U.S.
at 539. Even prior to the adoption of the Constitution, states such as Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts had determined to abolish slavery. In 1780, Pennsylvania passed "An act for
the gradual abolition of slavery." See An Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery (1780), in
10 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 1682 TO 1801, at 67-69 (1904). In 1780,
Massachusetts abolished slavery outright with the adoption of its Declaration of Rights. See
Mass. Declaration of Rights of 1780, amended by MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1. ("All men are
born free and equal."); see also John C. Eastman, Re--evaluating the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, 6 CHAPMAN L. REV. 123, 127 (2003). By the end of the Revolutionary
War, most New England states had followed suit. Conflicts concerning fugitive slaves had
been great sources of friction between states prior to the Convention and continued to plague
interstate relations. For a discussion of this friction, see Prigg, 41 U.S. at 611-21. See also
HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 8, at 90-91.49 See generally Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Actionfor the Master Class: The Creation
of the Proslavery Constitution, 32 AKRON L. REV. 423 (1999).
50 I refer to federalism as a political theory not in the sense of Federalists vs.
Antifederalists, but rather to connote the distribution of power within a confederated
republican form of government. See generally WILLIAM EVERDELL, THE END OF KINGS: A
HISTORY OF REPUBLICS AND REPUBLICANS (2000); PAUL RAHE, REPUBLICS ANCIENT AND
MODERN (1994).
51 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison).
2004-20051
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
beginning in 1808, in exchange for an abolitionist concession requiring
cooperation in the return of fugitive slaves to their slave owners. This
compromise over slavery at the Convention resulted in four constitutional
provisions, all of which addressed the distribution of power within the new
government. Three explicitly concerned the location of legal authority over
the issue of slavery, 52 with the fourth counting slaves as three-fifths of a
person for purposes of apportioning representatives in the House and for
taxation.
53
Of the three clauses which confirmed the federalism balance on the issue
of slavery, the first is found in Article I, § 9, and provided that:
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a
Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten
dollars for each Person.
5 4
This clause limited congressional power to forbid the importation of
slaves into any state that deemed it lawful. The slavery provision of Article
V also directly implicated the location of authority to decide the lawfulness
of such enslavement. This Article forbade until 1808 any amendment of the
Constitution that would affect the above-quoted section of Article I, § 9.55
Interestingly, both of these clauses explicitly recognized the balance in the
federal system on this issue as temporary.56 Article IV, § 2, cl. 3 was
carefully designed to circumscribe a free state's ability to manumit someone
who had escaped from slavery in another state. The Fugitive Slave Clause
required other states to respect the slave state's laws and return any escaped
slave found in its jurisdiction.57
52 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (forbidding Congress from prohibiting importation of
slaves before 1808); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (the fugitive slave clause requiring other
states to return fugitive slaves to slave state); U.S. CONST. art. V (forbidding amendment of
the Constitution to affect importation of slaves or capitation tax before 1808).
53 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
55 U.S. CONST. art. V. This provision also forbade until 1808 any amendment that
would affect the direct capitation provision found in Article I, § 9, cl. 4.
56 It should also be noted that this provision was an exception from the federalism
principle that vested authority "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations" in Congress.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Recognizing the temporary nature of the prohibition of
congressional power to legislate in this area in no way altered the authority of a state to
support or condone slavery under its own laws.
57 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("No Person held to Service or Labour in one State,
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on
Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.").
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These three clauses' clear (if not explicit) references to slavery in the
original Constitution cemented that issue within the structural delineations of
power in our founding document. While the debates about slavery had many
facets, political arguments concerning abolition could no longer be
conceived without reference to the constitutional distribution of power in our
federal system.
Despite the Convention's compromise on slavery and passage of the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, Northern states, such as Pennsylvania, adopted
statutory provisions designed to frustrate the return of slaves and the
kidnapping of free men to be sold for profit.5 8 Slave states aggressively
pursued what they deemed to be the lawful property rights of their citizens.
Not surprisingly, conflicts spilled over into state and federal courtrooms.
One of the primary weapons used by both sides was that which had long
been used to delineate governmental power-the writ of habeas corpus.59
Habeas corpus was seen as a weapon that could be used to exploit some of
the ambiguities left by the Fugitive Slave Clause and its enabling legislation,
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. As Professor Arkin noted, "One result of the
1793 [Fugitive Slave] Act's weakness was ... increased use of state habeas
corpus to test the legality of the slaveholder's claim to the person
detained.'60
C. Habeas Corpus and Slavery in the Early Years of Our Republic
Habeas corpus occupies a unique position in our system, as a common
law procedure specifically mentioned in the original text of the
Constitution.6' Moreover, the manner in which it is mentioned, prohibiting
Congress from suspending the privilege except during times of rebellion or
invasion, provides evidence of its exalted stature in the eyes of the Framers.
Further evidence of the writ's importance to the Framers was provided by
the First Congress, whose membership included many of those involved in
drafting and ratifying the Constitution. That Congress explicitly included the
writ of habeas corpus within the jurisdiction of all federal courts in the
Judiciary Act of 1789.62 This act, promulgated the same year the Constitution
was ratified, was the first in an unbroken string of Judiciary Acts providing
58 See, e.g., Africans in America, Part 3, Kidnapping in Pennsylvania, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part3/3p325.htm (last visited May 22, 2005).
59 See generally Arkin, Ghost at the Banquet, supra note 17, for an informative
exposition on the use of habeas corpus by both sides in this great conflict.
60Id. at 35.
61 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
62 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (1789).
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for federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.63 The scope and application of the
privilege would change during the first century of this nation's history, as
slavery and federalism shaped its use.
In the early years following adoption of the Constitution, habeas corpus
practice bore scant resemblance to the present-day writ. 64 Habeas corpus
practice at this time reflected the federalism balance that had been achieved
at the Convention. 65 Initially, the writ was sought and obtained pre-
66dominantly in state courts. This would change, however, as the fight over
slavery intensified.67
Consistent with the compromises reached on the slavery issue at the
Constitutional Convention, Congress sought to implement the Fugitive Slave
Clause with enabling legislation in the form of the Fugitive Slave Act of
1793.68 The support for this act was far from universal.69 In part, this disdain
stemmed from moral opposition to slavery and, in part, from the fact that
slave traders were kidnapping free blacks and selling them into slavery.70 In
63 The act provided federal courts with "power to issue writs of... habeas corpus" to
prisoners "in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States." Id § 14.
64 See, e.g., Arkin, Ghost at the Banquet, supra note 17, at 9. Both the traditional
common law scope of the writ, applying only to unlawful custody without proper
adjudication, and the statutory limitations imposed by Congress, which were consistent with
the common law practice, contributed to the infrequent use of the federal writ during the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Examination of the federal circuit court records
does not bear out the oft-asserted proposition that use of the writ remained so constricted
until 1867. Some "re-litigation" of state convictions was occurring in the mid-nineteenth
century. See, e.g., Habeas Corpus Case Records, 1820-1863, of the U.S. Circuit Court for
the District of Columbia, 1820-1863, microfilm publication M434 (Nat'l Archives &
Records Serv., Gen. Servs. Admin., Washington, D.C. 1963).
65 "The first federal habeas act reflected the importance of state power at the time of the
framing. ... ." Arkin, Ghost at the Banquet, supra note 17, at 9.
66 See id. at 10. Some commentators have noted the possibility that the Suspension
Clause was aimed at preventing Congress from suspending the state writ. See WILLIAM F.
DUKER, A CONST[TuTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 155 (1980). The historical
evidence, however, does not clearly support such an interpretation. See Jordan Steiker,
Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is there a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REv. 862, 865 (1994).
67 Frequently, the individuals seeking the writ in state court were abolitionists; this was
unsurprising for several reasons. First, abolitionist state officers expected to receive a more
favorable hearing in their own state courts. This was due not only to the perceived greater
likelihood of predisposition toward the abolitionist position, but also to the fact that it was
state law which arguably required the release of a fugitive slave. Second, the Federal
Constitution and statutes offered little hope of relief. Finally, the use of a federal writ was
uncommon at this time and would likely have been deemed unavailable to free someone
from state custody.
68 Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 302-03 (repealed 1864).
69 See James Forman, Jr., Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century, 113 YALE L.J.
895, 899-902 (2004), for discussion of resistance in Pennsylvania and otherNorthern states.
70 id.
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response to what was perceived as an encroachment upon their own state
sovereignty, many free states began passing and applying kidnapping laws to
those agents who were seeking to return escaped slaves to their masters.7
The slavery conflict, not surprisingly, was regionally divisive, with the
Northern states seeking to frustrate the return of fugitive slaves.7 2 As the
debate over slavery intensified, habeas corpus was used more frequently, as
both sides in this conflict more aggressively sought recourse with the writ.
Federal legislation during this period would shape the effectiveness of
these various regional efforts to control the outcome of the slavery debate
through habeas corpus. The most discernible trend in congressional
enactments concerning habeas corpus during the first century after adoption
of the Constitution would be the protection and exaltation of federal power.
For, while the initial Judiciary Act in many ways confirmed the primacy of
state habeas power as understood at the framing, "each successive act
extended national power over the states in order to protect a necessary
federal function from state encroachments. 7 3
Twice, prior to the Civil War, Congress extended the habeas corpus
jurisdiction of federal courts to reach prisoners held pursuant to state-court
criminal procedures. In 1833, Congress granted federal courts the authority
to intervene in state criminal proceedings on behalf of federal officers
arrested for acting in conformity with federal law. 74 Nine years later,
71 See THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: TIHE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE
NORTH, 1780-1861, 16-19 (1974); see also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539,
608-09 (1842); Stephen J. Safranek, Race and the Law, Or How the Courts and the Law
Have Been Warped by Racial Injustice, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 1025, 1031 (2002).72 The War of 1812 cooled the heat of regional debate over slavery as the nation united
to fight a common enemy. Following the war, however, slavery once again became a source
of regional friction. As Professor Arkin noted:
The War of 1812 postponed the national crisis over slavery, although it provided a
foretaste of the creative uses of habeas corpus yet to come. As the sectional crisis
resolved itself into a crisis of federal state relations, fueled by westward territorial
expansion, both sides had recourse to the ancient weapon in intragovernmental
squabbles: the writ of habeas corpus. Much of the battle was played out over the
plight of fugitive slaves ....
Arkin, Ghost at the Banquet, supra note 17, at 33.
73 Id. at 9. Arkin notes that most modem commentators assume that the 1833 and 1842
acts did not enlarge the types of custody embraced by the writ; they simply extended existing
federal practice to a new group, a limited class of persons in state custody. Id. (citing Note,
The Freedom Writ -The Expanding Use of Federal Habeas Corpus, 61 HARV. L. REV. 657,
659 (1948)). Professor Arkin's discussion of cases in Section V of Ghost at the Banquet
refutes this view. See Arkin, Ghost at the Banquet, supra note 17, at 42-59.
74 Habeas Corpus Act of 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634 (1833); see also Herbert
Wechsler, Habeas Corpus and the Supreme Court: Reconsidering the Reach of the Great
Writ, 59 U. COL. L. REV. 167, 168 (1988).
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Congress passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1842, which extended federal
habeas jurisdiction:
[T]o all cases of any prisoner or prisoners in jail or confinement, where he,
she, or they, being subjects or citizens of a foreign State, and domiciled
therein, shall be committed or confined, or in custody, under or by any
authority or law, or process founded thereon, of the United States, or of
any one of them, for or on account of any act done or omitted under any
alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption, set up or
claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction, of any foreign State
or Sovereignty, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of
nations, or-under color thereof.
7"
These two legislative extensions of federal habeas corpus to reach into state-
court criminal proceedings tracked the trend of judicial decisions exalting
federal judicial power over state-court proceedings and presaged the more
dramatic shift in'the federalism balance that followed the Civil War.
76
D. The Federalism Balance and Habeas Corpus in the Antebellum
Nineteenth Centry
The effect of the slavery compromise at the Constitutional Convention
created a rough'equilibrium that would last as long as the number of slave
and free states remained somewhat balanced.77 At the ratification of the
Constitution, there were six slave states and seven "free" states. 78 As states
joined the Union, continual compromises were reached to maintain that
balance. This distribution was vitally important for the federal/state balance.
Both sides sought, at a minimum, to protect their relative voting influence in
Congress. Slave states not only feared losing their ability to effect federal
legislation such as the Fugitive Slave Act,7 9 but they also recognized that the
75 Habeas Corpus Act of 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (1842) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (c)(4) (1993)).
76 see Alan Clarke, Habeas Corpus: The Historical Debate, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM.
RTs., 399-405 (1998).
77 See Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of
Independence, Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMPLE L. REv. 361, 374
(1993).. 78 The original slave states were Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia. The seven remaining states had either abolished slavery or were in
the process of outlawing slavery When the Constitution was adopted. These "free" states
were Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and
New Hampshire. See Africans in America, Part 3, Narrative, Map: The Growing Nation,
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part3/map3.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
79 The Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850 were considered by some to represent a
blow to state sovereignty in that they permitted slave owners to enter a free state, seize a
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continued admission of free states without additional slave states to balance
them out could lead to the passage of a constitutional amendment prohibiting
slavery outright.
The slavery conflict intensified, therefore, as new territory was acquired
by the federal government. Between 1791 and 1821, six new slave states
were added to the union: Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Mississippi,
Louisiana, and Alabama. During this same period, five additional free states
also joined: Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Vermont, and Maine.80 These additions
brought the number of slave and free states to thirteen each. The wrangling
over whether each new state would be free or slave was bitterly fought and
was emblematic of the slavery conflict throughout the, first half of the
nineteenth century. The land obtained in 1803 by the federal government as
part of the Louisiana Purchase would become one of the early focal points of
this battle over the addition of states carved from newly acquired territory.
Missouri's application for statehood in 1819 triggered fear among partisans
on both sides of this divide. Abolitionists vowed to keep Missouri free, while
pro-slavery forces were driven to expand their power through the addition of
another slave state. Eventually the "Missouri Compromise" was reached,
through which Missouri entered the union as a slave state, while the State of
Maine was carved from Massachusetts and admitted as the balancing free
state.8 'Through this compromise, an imaginary line was drawn at 36 degrees
30 minutes north latitude, above which slavery would be prohibited in this
territory.
82
In the Northern states resistance to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793
continued to be strong. Kidnapping statutes were being used to arrest slave-
catchers acting under authority of this federal law. Consequently, Southern
states resorted to the federal writ to free their agents who were being
incarcerated for actions authorized under existing federal law. 3 At the same
time, the Northern states were resorting to state-court writs in an attempt to
suspected runaway slave, and bring the slave before a judge who, upon proof of ownership,
would issue a certificate allowing the slave owner to return to the slave state with his
"property." Slave states, however, saw these laws as absolutely essential to their own
sovereignty.
80 See Africans in America, supra note 78.
81 id. ,\,,
82 Id. After thousands of slave owners from Missouri and other southern states poured
into Kansas and voted for a pro-slavery congressional delegation, the resulting Kansas
legislature adopted in toto the slave codes of Missouri. The Kansas pro-slavery laws
mandated death or imprisonment of hard labor for anyone aiding a runaway slave. See id.
The Compromise of 1850 was abrogated by the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 and declared
invalid by the Supreme Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857),
superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
83 Arkin, Ghost at the Banquet, supra note 17, at 38-42.
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wrest control of escaped slaves from their captors. In time, the United States
Supreme Court eventually asserted the dominance of federal courts over
those of the several states.
Prigg v. Pennsylvania84 is a complex decision in which the Supreme
Court established federal supremacy over the fugitive slave issue.85 In a case
that, not surprisingly, divided the Court so strongly that seven separate
opinions were issued, the Court upheld the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793,86 and
struck down the Pennsylvania Personal Liberty Law of 1826.87 While not a
habeas case, this was the first case heard by the Supreme Court under the
Fugitive Slave Act. Its decision 1) upholding the validity of federal law and
2) declaring unconstitutional a state law placing limitations on the federal
constitutional and statutory fugitive-slave provisions had important
repercussions for the balance of power and the uses of habeas corpus in our
federal system.
The implications of the Prigg decision for habeas corpus proceedings
would become clearer with the Court's ruling in Ableman v. Booth.88 Booth
was a Wisconsin abolitionist who had assisted a fugitive slave in escaping.
He was subsequently prosecuted in federal court. Wisconsin courts were
thrice presented with petitions for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds
that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was unconstitutional. The first and third
of these writs were granted. The Supreme Court reversed the Wisconsin
court's decision to grant the writs, holding that state courts could not issue a
writ of habeas corpus to free one held under authority of federal law. 89 As
Professor Arkin noted:
[Prigg and Booth] illustrate that the battle between state and federal
interests in the north was playing itself out in the courtroom through the
use of habeas corpus, the traditional common-law weapon in
intragovernmental warfare. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 turned these
relatively minor engagements into pitched battles. Booth was the
culmination of one such battle. 90
While slavery was the issue about which both sides were fighting, and
habeas corpus was the weapon of choice in this battle, the battlefield itself
84 44 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
85 For an interesting discussion concerning the difficulties that Prigg has engendered,
see Paul Finkelman, Sorting out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 605 (1993).
86 Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793).
8' Personal Liberty Law of 1826, ch. L, 1826 Pa. Laws 150 (1826).
" 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).89 In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1 (1854); Exparte Booth, 3 Wis. 145 (1854); see James Gardner,
State Courts as Agents of Federalism: Power and Interpretation in State Constitutional
Law, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1725 (2003).
90 Arkin, Ghost at the Banquet, supra note 17, at 41.
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was our nation's system of federalism. The nation's westward expansion put
the federal system under great stress. The intertwined strands of slavery and
federalism frayed greatly as the nation struggled to incorporate vast tracts of
land divided into new states: would they be admitted as slave or free states?
While the country's expansion through the second decade of the nineteenth
century caused some stress and strain through a process of compromise that
carefully balanced slave and free states, some semblance of stability was
maintained. After California and Texas were acquired, however, a nation
which had walked a delicate high wire upon that braided rope of slavery and
federalism tottered and threatened to collapse with the addition of
unbalancing new territories.
The acquisition of Texas and California dramatically increased the area
under the control of the U.S. government. The number of states that might
be created out of these territories-and, more importantly, whether they
would permit slavery--caused the simmering debate over slavery to boil.
The Compromise of 1850 admitted California as a free state but adopted the
powerful Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.9 Even after the issues of California
and Texas were temporarily resolved, the dispute would spill over into open
conflict regarding the Nebraska Territory. The 1850 Act, coupled with the
Dred Scott decision handed down in 1856, would radicalize many anti-
slavery forces and give birth to the Republican Party.92 This party, officially
opposed to the spread of slavery, would become the political home of many
abolitionists who would become a legislative force during the following
decade.93
The Fugitive Slave Act of 185094 contained greatly enhanced powers to
capture and return runaway slaves.95 That act mandated procedures for
returning escaped slaves to their states of enslavement,96 including the use of
federal officers to take custody of the escapees and transport them back to
91 Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864). This act, with its
increased powers to seize fugitives and return them to their former owners, would trigger
greater recourse to habeas corpus and further define the limits of power in our system of
federalism. See also Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Fugitive Act of 1850).
92 See A. Christopher Bryant, Stopping Time: The Pro-Slavery and "'Irrevocable"
Thirteenth Amendment, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 501, 516-18 (2003).
9 3 See id. at 518-19.
94 Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864).
95 See id.; see also Rebecca E. Zietlow, John Bingham and the Meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment: Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Bingham 's
Theory of Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REv. 717, 722 (2003).
96 They were to be returned both to the geographical state from which they fled and to
the condition of involuntary servitude.
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the slave state from where they had escaped.97 Slave states believed the
Fugitive Slave Act to be not only consistent with the Fugitive Slave Clause
of the Constitution but also necessary to give effect to the divisions of power
that formed part of the original Constitution. Conversely, many in the free
states not only felt that the return of fugitive slaves was immoral, but they
also believed that this act represented an affront to their own rights under the
system of federalism.98 Free states began resorting to state-court writs of
habeas corpus to gain release of recaptured slaves. Slave states responded
by seeking federal writs of habeas corpus to free their agents imprisoned by
the free states. The federal writ was also increasingly used by free blacks
who were unjustly taken into custody as runaway slaves. 99
For instance; an examination of the habeas corpus records from the
federal district courts at this time provides ample evidence of free blacks
resorting to the writ in an effort to thwart slave-traders seeking to enslave
them again.'00 Some freed slaves used the writ to establish their freedom as
early as 1831. For instance, one Levi Snow, also known as Levi Reed, was
"discharged on proof of freedom this 26[th] July 1831."'o' Increasing
numbers of freed men and women also challenged their detention in this
manner, including Horace Gales, "free colored man,"' 102 John Young, "a
mulatto,' 1 3 and Julia Thompson, "a free Negro woman."' 1 4 Some, such as
Levi Snow, John Young, and one "Negro Sally Jones,"' 1 5 were explicitly
ordered freed following habeas proceedings.
0 6
97 Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864).
98 This might be one of the few things that abolitionists and slave owners had in
common concerning the issue of slavery. In some sense, each felt aggrieved that their own
state sovereignty was being diminished. The Fugitive Slave Act, while a victory for slave
owners, in one way represented a blow to state power in that it permitted slave owners to
enter a free state, seize a suspected runaway slave and bring the slave before afederaljudge,
who, upon proof of ownership, would issue a certificate allowing the slave owner to return to
the slave state with his "property."
99 See, e.g., Habeas Corpus Case Records, 1820-1863, supra note 17, Rolls 1 & 2;
Records of the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Columbia Relating to Slaves, 1851-
1863, supra note 17.
'oo See, e.g., Habeas Corpus Case Records, 1820-1863, supra note 17, Rolls 1 & 2;
Records of the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Columbia Relating to Slaves, 1851-
1863, supra note 17.
101 Habeas Corpus Records from Habeas Corpus Case Records, 1820-1863, supra note
17, at Roll 1, 0198.
112 Id. at Roll 1, 006-07.
... Id. at Roll 1,064, 067.
'o4 Id. at Roll 2, 027-28.
'(5 1d. at Roll 1,149.
106 One of the interesting things about these habeas records is that they show that, on
some occasions, federal courts were looking beyond the facial validity of the return, even
following state judicial proceedings, and conducting a hearing to determine "actual
innocence" of the offenses charged.
[VOL. 93
TIME OUT OF MIND
These uses of habeas corpus not only concerned individuals asserting
their rights, they also directly implicated the federal-state distribution of
power. Each state jealously guarded its own prerogative to remain slave or
free and, through habeas corpus, sought to have its internal laws on this
matter respected by sister states. The manner in which the various states used
the writ of habeas corpus affected the federal-state balance of power in a
number of sometimes counterintuitive ways.
The important lessons to be learned from this history are the following:
1) habeas corpus was a weapon of choice among those who were fighting the
legal battle over slavery, 2) all parties who used habeas corpus in this
struggle did so while asserting authority to determine the lawfulness of an
escaped slave's servitude, and 3) the consistent trend in federal court rulings
in these cases was the exaltation of federal authority over state-custody
determinations and the concomitant diminution of state authority regarding
similar federal custody determinations.
II. THE CIVIL WAR AND THE POSTWAR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
The metaphorical habeas battles in state and federal courts soon became
real battles fought across the divided country. Although some have insisted
the Civil War was fought over only slavery or only "States' Rights,"' 7 it was
fought over the intertwined issues of slavery and federalism. Historical study
has confirmed these facts, and it is not my purpose to provide a compelling
new look at the history of that great conflict. 10 8 Instead, this section will
examine some of the economic and political interests that defined the
struggle over abolition and the roles that habeas corpus 'and federalism
played in that struggle, a struggle which led to the Civil War and the
constitutional amendments that fundamentally altered the distribution of
power regarding slavery.
A. Economic and Political Interests in Slavery
It is well known that antebellum Southern society was agrarian, with an
oligarchy of rich white plantation owners who dominated the economy. 1° 9
While the Southern interests in slavery were strong at the time of the
Constitution's adoption, the economic reliance upon forced labor increased
107 See Snyder, supra note 20, at 242-43.
1o8 See generally, e.g., ERIc FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1988).
109 See, e.g., Africans in America, Part 2. Freedom and Bondage in the Colonial Era,
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part2/2narrl .html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
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dramatically in the decades following its ratification. This was due largely to
the invention of the cotton gin in 1793.110 The total value of the U.S. cotton
crop rose from $150,000 to over $8 million in the first -ten years after the
cotton gin was used.' With increased planting of cotton came an increased
need for labor. The slave population nearly doubled from approximately
575,000 in 1781 to 900,000 in 1801.112 Despite this increased reliance upon
slavery, Congress eliminated importation of slaves in 1808, the first year that
Congress had constitutional authority to do so."13 However, this did not curb
the demand for slaves; it merely increased their monetary value.114 The
number of slaves more than doubled again in the first thirty years of the
nineteenth century, to more than two million by 1830.115 Cotton quickly
became the nation's number-one cash crop,1 6 and this economic engine was
fueled by the blood and sweat of slaves. The robust Southern economy (and
the privileged place of the plantation owners) depended upon slave labor.
1 7
States also had a direct economic interest in the institution of slavery.
110 See Africans in America, Part 3, Eli Whitney's Cotton Gin, Douglas Egerton on
Cotton, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part3/3i3124.html (last visited Mar. 22,
2005). This might at first blush seem to be counterintuitive. The cotton gin, a labor-saving
device, actually increased the demand for labor because it made cotton enormously more
profitable. Before the invention of the gin, the cleaning of cotton was so labor intensive that
other uses for land produced equal or more profit. With the invention of the gin, however,
vast plantations were devoted exclusively to cotton, requiring more and more field hands to
plant and harvest the crops.
111 See Africans in America, Part 3, Growth and Entrenchment of Slavery, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part3/3narr6.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
112 "In 1781, the estimated population of the United States was 3.5 million. About
575,000 of these were slaves. In 1801, the year Thomas Jefferson becamc president, the
population of the United States was 5,308,000, with 900,000 slaves." Africans in America,
Part 3, The Growing New Nation, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aialpart3/nap3
_txt.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
113 See Act of March 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426.
114 The value of slaves in Virginia in 1800 was approximately $333 for a healthyyoung
male field hand and as much as $500 for a literate or highly skilled slave. That figure rose to
$700 to $800 for a "good" or "fair" field hand in 1849. See Africans in America, Part 3, List
and Inventory of Negroes on Plantation, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part3/
3h503.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
iiSSee Africans in America, Part 3, The Growing Nation, available at http://www.
pbs.6rg/ wgbh/aia/part3/map3.html.
116Id.- see also DOUGLAS C. NORTH, THE ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES,
1790-1860, at 62-68 (1961).
117 See M. CherifBassiouni, Enslavement as an International Crime, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 445, 451 (1991). The Southern economy was truly an oligarchy, where a relatively
few plantation owners reaped all of the wealth. Seventy-five percent of Southern whites did
not own slaves. Of those who did own slaves, 88% owned twenty or fewer. Most slaves were
owned by the large plantation owners, who stood to lose most if slavery were abolished. See
Africans in America, Part 4, Conditions ofAntebellum Slavery, available at http://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/aia/part4/4p2956.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
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For slave states, "poll taxes and levies on slaves, luxuries, commercial
activities, and professions provided the bulk of revenue." '118 In addition to
tax revenues, states sometimes directly profited from the slave trade. For
instance, a South Carolina law permitted the state to seize and hold any free
blacks on a ship that entered its ports. If the captain left the port without
reclaiming them, South Carolina could then sell the free blacks for profit. " 9
Thus, efforts to abolish slavery were deemed threats to the economy of the
Southern states, particularly to its privileged plantation owners. Not
surprisingly, these plantation owners resented and resisted efforts at
abolition, and their privileged place in Southern society enabled them to
assert their political will regarding the issue.
1. The Civil War
It became increasingly apparent that the conflict over slavery posed a
threat to the system of federalism with which it was so intertwined. Freedom
of travel, rights to personal "property," and the comity upon which a federal
system depends were all undermined by the inability to resolve the issue of
slavery. What succumbed to this strain was the Union itself. Slavery was not
just an issue of the federalism conflict that led to war, it was the issue that
brought this nation to the brink of destruction. Slavery's preeminence in this
conflict is evident in the numerous declarations of secession which
specifically identified slavery in the context of state's rights as a basis for
dissolution of the Union.120 The war that ensued took a higher percentage of
118 FONER, supra note 108, at 206. The economic benefits of the institution of slavery,
however, were not confined to the Southern states. Numerous industries based in the
Northern states also reaped profits from both slave trading and cotton. For details of this
economic benefit of slavery, see Derrick Bell, The CivilRights Chronicles, 99 HARv. L. REV.
4 n.2 (1985).
119 See Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366) (holding
the South Carolina law unconstitutional).
120 See, e.g., Confederate States of America, Declaration of the Immediate Causes
Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union,
December 24, 1860, available at the Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http://www.
yale.edullawweb/avalon/csa/scarsec.htm. The Constitution ofthe United States, in its fourth
Article, provides as follows: "No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be
discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to
whom such service or labor may be due." This stipulation was so material to the compact,
that without it that compact would not have been made. Id. For a general discussion on the
role slavery played in secession, see also Africans in America, Part 4, William Scarborough
on the Civil War and Emancipation, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/
4i3095.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005). (identifying the continued insistence by many
Southerners that economic differences and issues of states' rights, not slavery, led to the
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U.S. lives than any war in U.S. history. Approximately 600,000 individuals
died and hundreds of thousands were injured fighting over these issues.1
21
No war the United States has fought has been more catastrophic or more
essential to our moral well being. It is important to note that, even during
open conflict, habeas corpus continued as a weapon in this battle over
morality and federalism.
At the outset of the Civil' War, following the bombardment of Fort
Sumter, President Lincoln-took a series of dramatic steps to preserve the
Union. None of the steps taken by Lincoln was more dramatic, or more
vigorously condemned, than the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
122
Lincoln suspended the writ in part due to the failure of local authorities to
respect his call for state militias to join the fight against secession, and he
simultaneously arrested thousands of Confederate sympathizers. Eventually
over 18,000 people would be arrested under executive order. 123 Lincoln took
these actions after Baltimore officials burned bridges and Baltimore mobs
attacked trains carrying U.S. soldiers headed to Washington.124 The
continuing animosity of local police, politicians, and judges led the president
to conclude that he had to suspend the writ of habeas corpus to prevent it
from being used by rebels to free Confederate sympathizers.125 Yet, even in
the face of direct hostile action, Lincoln understood the sanctity of this
procedure. In Lincoln's order to Lieutenant-General Scott, dated April 25,
1861, he was clearly more reluctant to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
than to order the bombardment of Maryland's cities. Lincoln, fearing that the
Maryland legislature-was about to secede, ordered General Scott to "adopt
the most prompt and efficient means to counteract, even, if necessary, to the
bombardment of their cities and, in the extremest necessity, the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus."126 This "extremest necessity" came to pass, and
on eight separate occasions Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus. 1
27
Civil War).
121 Most accountings indicate that the Civil War cost more U.S. lives than World War
II. See Casualties in the Civil War, available at http://www.civilwarhome.com/casualties
.html. Precise statistics on casualties from the Civil War are difficult to find. This author
located various statistics indicating the number of dead during the Civil War to be between
497,821 and 700,000. In any event, the Civil War was clearly the most catastrophic and
costly in terms of deaths as a percentage of the U.S. population as a whole.
122 HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 8, at 232-35.
1231 d. at 233.
1
24
" WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CiviL LIBERTIES LN WARTIME 15-
25 (1998).
125 HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 8, at 238; see also REHNQUIST, supra note 124, at 22-
25.
126 REHNQUIST, supra note 124, at 24 (emphasis added).
127 See ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Proclamation Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus
(1862), in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 436-37 (Roy P. Bolger et al. eds.,
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A notorious secessionist, John Merryman, challenged the suspension of
habeas corpus. Merryman was arrested for recruiting and training troops for
the Confederacy. Housed in the Fort McHenry guardhouse with access to a
lawyer, Merryman petitioned U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Taney, a
fellow Marylander, for a writ of habeas corpus. Taney issued the writ,
ordering Merryman to be produced. 28 The commander of the fort, upon
authority of the president's order suspending the writ, refused. Taney issued
a stinging opinion in which he stated that the president had no authority to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and called upon Lincoln to honor his
constitutional duty to enforce the laws.
129
Lincoln's suspension of the writ during the war and his subsequent
explanation and justification for doing so serve to highlight the writ's
importance. In his July 4, 1861 message to Congress, Lincoln criticized
Chief Justice Taney's decision in Ex parte Merryman,1 suggesting that
Taney's decision would allow "all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and
the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated." '' In this battle
between federal branches, President Lincoln acknowledged the primacy of
habeas corpus as an instrument to define the boundaries of constitutional
power.
2.. The War's Aftermath
With the surrender of the Confederate forces at Appomattox, the formal
armed conflict over slavery ceased. 32 Lincoln was killed on April 14, 1865,
only five days after the surrender.133 We now know that President Lincoln
was not eager to pursue a complete and immediate emancipation, preferring
a plan of more gradual transition' 34 Initially Lincoln, and then President
Johnson, was responsible for much of what was done to "reconstruct" the
South following the war. With the cessation of hostilities, the states in
rebellion wer e effectively in legal limbo. They were states without state
1953).
128 HyvMAN & WIECEK, supra note 8, at 238-39.
129 REHNQUIST, supra note 124, at 3 3-35.
"30 Exparte Merrymnan, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.D. Md, 1861) (No. 9,487).
131 Id. at 38; see also LINCOLN, supra note 127, at 436-37.
132 David F. Forte, Spiritual Equality, The Black Codes, and the Americanization of the
Freedmen, 43 Loy. L. REv. 569, 596 (1998).
133 id.
134 While Lincoln wanted to end slavery, he favored a more gradual approach. See
Avalon Project at Yale Law School, The Problem of Reconstruction, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/treatise/andrewjohnson/chap_01.htm. (last visited Mar.
22, 2005).
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governments, and so fell under the control of the federal government.
Presidential power to reconstruct was justified under both the commander-
in-chief authority and-oddly-under his pardon power. 35 Thus, when the
war ended, a time of "Presidential Reconstruction" began. Neither Lincoln
nor Johnson proposed the idea of universal emancipation. The Emancipation
Proclamation, signed on January 1, 1863, freed only the slaves who resided
in the areas of rebellion, but it did not abolish slavery in its entirety. 13 6 With
the war drawing to a conclusion, on March 13, 1865, President Lincoln
signed a joint resolution granting freedom to all who had served in the Union
army and their families. 137 This action, while a significant step, fell short of
complete abolition. 
38
In the same month that Lincoln signed thejoint resolution freeing black
soldiers and their families, Congress created the Freedmen's Bureau. In "An
Act to establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees," passed
on March 3, 1865, Congress authorized the president to appoint a
commissioner whose office, established in the War Department, would
continue during the present war of rebellion, and for one year thereafter, a
bureau of refugees, freedmen, and abandoned lands, to which shall be
committed, as hereinafter provided, the supervision and management of all
abandoned lands, and the control of all subjects relating to refugees and
freedmen from rebel states, or from any district of country within the
territory embraced in the operations of the army, under such rules and
regulations as may be prescribed by the head of the bureau and approved
by the President. 1
39
The Freedmen's Bureau was originally intended to remain in existence
for the duration of hostilities, plus one year.140 While the scope of power
granted to the executive under the act is clearly broad, there is a noticeable
lack of specificity in this mandate. Subsequently, Congress expanded both
the time limits initially placed upon the Freedmen's Bureau and the
directives it provided to the executive. In a subsequent amendment of this
act, over President Johnson's veto, Congress directed the president and his
agents to secure the rights and immunities of all freedmen against unequally
1
35 id.
136 HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 8, at 253-54.
137 See id.
138 Id. The proclamation was actually issued on September 22, 1862 but gave states in
rebellion the opportunity to rejoin the Union before January 1, 1863. No rebel states took
advantage of that opportunity. Id.
13' Act ofMarch 3, 1865, ch. 90, § 1, 13 Stat. 507, reprinted in 13 STATUTES ATLARGE,
TREATIES, AND PROCLAMATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 507-09 (Boston, 1866).
140 See id.
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applied laws. 
141
The Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery was adopted on
December 6, 1865.142 That amendment, however, contains an important
exception that permits involuntary servitude for those convicted of crimes.
43
Given their consistent resistance to abolition, Southern states reacted with
predictable hostility and obstructionism. Mississippi even refused to ratify
the amendment. 44 Several former slave states enacted a series of laws that
became known collectively as the "Black Codes."' 14 5 These laws sought to
circumvent the Thirteenth Amendment and replace the individual slave
holder with the state as master of this servant race. For instance, a portion of
the Black Code of Mississippi, although styled as "An Act to Confer Civil
Rights on Freedmen, and for other Purposes," read as follows:
Section 6. [A]II contracts for labor made with freedmen, free negroes
and mulattoes for a longer period than one month shall be in writing, and a
duplicate, attested and read to said freedman, free negro or mulatto by a
beat, city or county officer, or two disinterested white persons of the
county in which the labor is to be performed, of which each party shall
have one: and said contracts shall be taken and held as entire contracts,
and if the laborer shall quit the service of the employer before the
expiration of his term of service, without good cause, he shall forfeit his
wages for that year up to the time of quitting.
Section 7. Every civil officer shall, and every person may, arrest and
carry back to his or her legal employer any freedman, free negro, or
141 Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173, 176-77 (1866).
142 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
143 Id. The Thirteenth Amendment permits slavery for those lawfully convicted of
crimes. The Black Codes attempted to capitalize on this exception and upend the new order
brought about by the Civil War and this subsequent constitutional amendment. As discussed
in more detail, infra, Congress responded by passing the Civil Rights Act which took aim at
these codes. An additional constitutional amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, however,
proved necessary to prevent recalcitrance and to cement within the Constitution the new
distribution of power over race-based deprivations of liberty. Federal habeas corpus was
necessary to remove these determinations from the states which had repeatedly shown
themselves to be incapable of protecting minority rights.
144 See Amendments to the Constitution, at http://www.law.emory.edu/erd/docQs/
usconst/amend.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005). Other states, including New Jersey,
Delaware, and Kentucky, originally refused to ratify this Amendment but did so later. Only
Mississippi has refused to ratify it to this day.
145 See, e.g., Bill Quigley & Maha Zaki, The Significance of Race: Legislative Racial
Discrimination in Louisiana, 1803-1865, 24 S.U. L. REv. 145, 147-53 (1997). For a
discussion of Texas' Black Codes, see The Handbook of Texas Online, Black Codes, at
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/BB/jsbl.html. (last modified
Mar. 8, 2005).
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mulatto who shall have quit the service of his or her employer before the
expiration of his or her term of service without good cause; and said
officer and person shall be entitled to receive for arresting and carrying
back every deserting employee aforesaid the sum of five dollars, and ten
cents per mile from the place of arrest to the place of delivery; and the
same shall be paid by the employer, and held as a set off for so much
against the wages of said deserting employee: Provided, that said arrested
party, after being so returned, may appeal to the justice of the peace or
member of the board of police of the county, who, on notice to the alleged
employer, shall try summarily whether said appellant is legally employed
by the alleged employer, and has good cause to quit said employer. Either
party shall have the right of appeal to the county court, pending which the
alleged deserter shall be remanded to the alleged employer or otherwise
disposed of, as shall be right and just; and the decision of the county court
shall be final.
146
Congressional Republicans recognized that many of the actions taken to
secure the liberty of the newly freed slaves, including the joint resolution
freeing families of Union soldiers, the creation of the Freedmen's Bureau,
and even the Thirteenth Amendment, would prove ineffective without some
mechanism of enforcing black citizens' liberty in the face of the Black
Codes. The day after the Thirteenth Amendment became effective, the
House of Representatives passed a resolution requiring the Judiciary
Committee
to inquire and report to the House, as soon as practicable, by bill or
otherwise, what legislation is necessary to enable the courts of the United
States to enforce the freedom of the wives and children of soldiers of the
United States under the joint resolution of March 3, 1865, and also to
enforce the liberty of all persons under the operation of the constitutional
amendment abolishing slavery. 
147
When reported out of the Judiciary Committee, this request took the
form of a "bill to secure the writ of Habeas Corpus to persons held in slavery
or involuntary servitude contrary to the Constitution of the United States."
148
This bill, in altered form, would eventually become the Habeas Corpus Act
of 1867. While the language of the act would change, its purpose to "enforce
'4 Black Code of Mississippi of 1865, available at http://www.usconstitution.com/
BlackCodesofMississippi.htm. (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
147 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1865); see also Clark D. Forsythe, The
Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Review Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DA.ME L. REv.
1079, 1109 (1995).
148 See Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal
Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 31, 34 (1965-66).
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the liberty of all persons under the operation of the constitutional amendment
abolishing slavery," would remain unchanged. 
149
Histories of the Reconstruction period have long recognized that the
Black Codes were designed "to put the state much in the place of the former
master."'150 White plantation owners believed that only through forced labor
could the production of cotton and its profitability be resumed and
maintained. The singular focus of these most powerful Southerners was to
adopt sweeping laws regarding labor, property rights, and the administration
of criminal law that would, in effect, combine to reinstate slavery.1 51 The
states and all their legislative, executive, and judicial offices would serve as
a buffer between the plantation owner and the former slave.
Henceforth, the state would enforce labor agreements and plantation
discipline, punish those who refused to contract, and prevent whites from
competing among themselves for black workers. The codes amply fulfilled
Radical Benjamin F. Flanders' prediction at a meeting of the assembled
Louisiana legislature: "Their whole thought and time will be given to plans
for getting things back as near to slavery as possible.'
5 2
Much to the chagrin of Republicans in Congress, President Johnson did
little to enjoin the recalcitrant states' efforts. President Johnson repeatedly
moved to thwart the Radical Republican agenda, vetoing all significant
pieces of legislation related to protection of the freedmen, including the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and the acts creating the Freedmen's Bureau and
expanding its jurisdiction.5 3 In rejecting the act which would continue in
existence while extending the powers of the Freedmen's Bureau, 5 4 Johnson
articulated a view of events in the South that diverged substantially from the
facts on the ground and the reports being heard by Congress:
149 A fuller discussion of the Habeas Corpus Act and its purpose in granting protection
to persons incarcerated due to impermissible consideration of race follows in Part II.C.3.
150 FONER, supra note 108, at 198; see also WILLIAM W. DAVIS, THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION IN FLORIDA 425 (1913).
'51 FONER, supra note 108, at 198.
As William H. Trescot explained to South Carolina's governor in December 1865,
"you will find that this question of the control of labor underlies every other
question of state interest." The ferment in the countryside, the history of other
societies that had experienced emancipation, and ideologies and prejudices
inherited from slavery, combined to convince the white South that only through
some form of coerced labor could the production of plantation staples be resumed.
Id.
152 Id. at 199 (quoting letter from Benjamin F. Flanders to Henry C. Warmoth (Nov. 23,
1865)).
153 Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1865); Act of July 16, 1866,
ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173 (1866).
154 Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173, 176-77 (1866).
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Let us not unnecessarily disturb the commerce and credit and industry of
the country by declaring to the American people and to the world that the
United States are still in a condition of civil war. At present there is no
part of our country in which the authority of the United States is disputed.
Offenses that may be committed by individuals should not work a
forfeiture of the rights of whole communities. The country has returned, or
is returning, to a state of peace and industry, and the rebellion is in fact at
an end. The measure, therefore, seems to be as inconsistent with the actual
condition of the country as it is at variance with the Constitution of the
United States.' 55
President Johnson's apparent ignorance of the reports being made by
Freedmen's Bureau agents could be interpreted benignly. Other statements
in his veto message, however, raised deeper concerns among the
Republicans in Congress. Johnson indicated, at best, an inability to
understand the conditions affecting the recently freed slaves:
His condition is not so exposed as may at first be imagined. He is in a
portion of the country where his labor can not well be spared. Competition
for his services from planters, from those who are constructing or repairing
railroads, and from capitalists in his vicinage or from other States will
enable him to command almost his own terms. He also possesses a perfect
right to change his place of abode, and if, therefore, he does not find in
one community or State a mode of life suited to his desires or proper
remuneration for his labor, he can move to another where that labor is
more esteemed and better rewarded. In truth, however, each State, induced
by its own wants and interests, will do what is necessary and proper to
retain within its borders all the labor that is needed for the development of
its resources. The laws that regulate supply and demand will maintain their
force, and the wages of the laborer will be regulated thereby. There is no
danger that the exceedingly great demand for labor will not operate in
favor of the laborer.1
56
This statement not only showed a failure to understand the conditions under
which the newly freed slaves existed, but it contained assertions that were
empirically and obviously false. For example, the Black Codes in virtually
every state forbade freedom of movement and contract. 1
57
President Johnson's veto statement also sent a strong signal to both
155 President Johnson's Freedmen's Bureau Veto Message, February 19, 1866,
available at http://itw.sewanee.edu/reconstruction/html/docs/freedveto.htm. (last visited
Mar. 22, 2005).
157 Black Code of Mississippi of 1865, §§ 6-7, available athttp://www.usconstitution.
com/BlackCodesofMississippi.htm. (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
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Congress and the states that the president would permit states to restrict the
very rights he claimed were already possessed by freed black citizens. By
characterizing as "necessary and proper" that which each state, "induced by
its own wants and interests" would do "to retain within its borders all the
labor that is needed for the development of its resources,"'5 8 Johnson sided
squarely with the proponents of the Black Codes.
Mississippi and South Carolina were among the most forthright in their
legislation, as their codes were explicitly aimed at freed blacks. 5 9 The
Mississippi legislature declared all penal codes defining crimes by slaves and
free blacks "in full force" unless specifically altered by law.160 Mississippi
required freed plantation workers to enter into labor contracts and restricted
the freed person from moving away from the plantation to the city. 16' If the
laborer sought to leave his job before the term of his contract was completed,
he would forfeit all previously earned wages under the contract. 162 In
addition, blacks who "violated" these employment contracts and attempted
to move were subject to arrest by any white citizen. 163 The punishment for
this crime was forced labor on the plantation. These restrictions on the right
to contract, the ability to move, and the right to own any substantial property
(when coupled with the power to arrest and sentence to forced labor)
resulted in the continuation of slavery under a new master. These codes
aimed to exploit the exception in the Thirteenth Amendment permitting
involuntary servitude for those convicted of crimes. Not surprisingly, the
158 President Johnson's Freedmen's Bureau Veto Message, February 19, 1866, supra
note 155.
159 See Donald G. Nieman, The Freedmen's Bureau and the Mississippi Black Code, 40
J. Miss. HIST. 91 (1978). When discussing the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, Senator Wilson
argued that the black codes of South Carolina, Mississippi, and Louisiana were "codes of
laws that practically make the freedman a peon or a serf." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 340 (1866).
160 FONER, supra note 108, at 200.
161 Id. at 199. Like Mississippi, South Carolina's code was explicitly racist. One
definition of "vagrant" found in the South Carolina Code was "unemployed black." Id. at
200. Severe penalties were imposed for vagrancy, usually forced labor on the plantation and
potentially physical punishment. Id. at 198. Other states were equally aggressive at keeping
the freed population under control. "Louisiana and Texas, seeking to counteract the
withdrawal of black women from field labor, mandated that contracts 'shall embrace the
labor of all the members of the family able to work.' Louisiana also provided that all
disputes between the employer and his laborers 'shall be settled ... by the former."' Id. at
200-01. The calls for such laws were commonplace and came from many quarters. One New
Orleans newspaper called the desired result a "new labor system... prescribed and enforced
by the state." Id. at 198. Former slave owners sought every opportunity to use the law as a
means of ensuring a ready supply of forced labor.
162 Black Code of Mississippi of 1865, § 6, supra note 157.
163Id. § 7.
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black population considered any attempt to limit its economic independence
to be an attempt to -continue the condition of slavery. Freed blacks resisted
efforts to enslave them again; white landowners feared an uprising.
Considerable violence characterized the period after the War.
Additionally, apprenticeship laws permitted recently freed young
persons to be taken from their families, with or without permission, and
forced to labor for white landowners:
[C]ourts bound out individuals for uncompensated labor who could hardly
be considered minors; one tenth of the apprentices in one North Carolina
county exceeded the age of sixteen, including an "orphan" working at a
turpentine mill and supporting his wife and child. To blacks, such
apprenticeships represented nothing less than a continuation of slavery.'64
These laws governing apprenticeships and labor in every form were
common to most states in the former Confederacy.1 65 Former slaves were
taxed heavily and therefore felt compelled to find work. 166 The threat of
vagrancy and de facto slave labor loomed over the heads of all who resisted
the new "legal"- slavery.167 Florida went so far as to criminalize disrespect
and impudence, 68 while Mississippi chose to make criminals of those who
"misspend what they earn."'169 The Freedmen's Bureau records are replete
with former slaves pleading for assistance to recover family members seized
by this state-sanctioned enslavement.17
0
Unfortunately, the heart-wrenching destruction of families and lost hope
naturally engendered by the stolen promise of freedom were not the worst of
164 FONER, supra note 108, at 201; see also id. at 202 (quoting Sidney Andrews, Three
Months Among the Reconstructionists, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1866, at 244 ("The statutes
regulating labor and apprenticeship, in the words of Northern reporter Sidney Andrews,
'acknowledge the overthrow of the special servitude of man to man, but seek... to establish
the general servitude of man to the commonwealth.' The same was true of new criminal laws
designed to enforce the property rights of landowners against the claims of their former
slaves.")).165 DONALD G. NIEMAN, To SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND THE
LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865-1868, at 73-98 (1979).
166 Conversely, land taxes remained extremely low. In many cases, the head tax paid by
the "legally" enslaved worker exceeded the entire tax burden paid by the large plantation
owner where the freedman was forced to labor. See FONER, supra note 108, at 206.
167 These laws were supplemented by statutes punishing any landowner who sought to
pay a fair wage to the freedmen. See, e.g., id. at 200. Thus, the laws sought to control both
blacks and whites.
168 See id.
169 See An Act to Amend the Vagrancy Laws of the State, § 1, available at http://www.
toptags.con/aama/docs/bcodes.htm. (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
170 See generally, e.g., Freedmen's Bureau Online, at http://www.freedmensbureau.com
(last visited Mar. 22, 2005), for detailed case studies and documents attesting to the
debilitating power of the Black Codes.
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what was happening to the recently freed slaves. There was widespread
violence in the South against freed blacks.17' The Black Codes and the
accompanying violence were a direct attack on the Thirteenth Amendment
and an attempt by the rebellious states to retain dominion over the authority
to determine the lawfulness of race-based deprivations of liberty within their
borders. Congress reacted by passing, again over the president's veto, the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.172 This landmark piece of legislation reasserted
federal dominance over this issue with provisions designed to give life to the
Thirteenth Amendment. The Civil Rights Act has frequently been described
as primarily concerned with economic rights, not "civil rights" as we have
come to use that term in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.1
73
This is true insofar that the Civil Rights Act did not grant suffrage or other
modem civil rights to freed slaves. However, it is a mistake to think of the
Civil Rights Act as being some sort of law and economics bill unconcerned
with restraints placed upon the physical liberty of the Freedmen. To the
contrary, the economic rights addressed by the Civil Rights Act were
precisely those rights infringed upon by the Black Codes.
The Civil Rights Act concerned itself with the freedom of contract and
the rights to purchase, lease, and convey real property precisely because the
Black Codes had permitted the continuation of slavery in the absence of
these rights. 174 The economic aspects of liberty, however, were not the only
171 The historical record is bursting with accounts of massive criminal bloodletting as
white southerners unleashed a reign of terror designed to crush emancipation before it took
hold. With President Johnson effectively giving a green light to Southern intransigence:
In some areas, violence against blacks reached staggering proportions in the
immediate aftermath of the war. In Louisiana, reported a visitor from North
Carolina in 1865, "they govern.., by the pistol and the rifle." "I saw white men
whipping colored men just the same as they did before the war," testified ex-slave
Henry Adams, who claimed that "over two thousand colored people" were
murdered in 1865 in the area around Shreveport, Louisiana. In Texas, where the
army and Freedmen's Bureau proved entirely unable to establish order, blacks,
according to a Bureau official, "are frequently beaten unmercifully, and shot down
like wild beasts, without any provocation .. " In 1866, after "some kind of
dispute with some freedmen," a group near Pine Bluff, Arkansas, set fire to a black
settlement and rounded up the inhabitants. A man who visited the scene the
following morning found "a sight that apald [sic] me [.124 Negro men woman and
children were hanging to trees all round the Cabbins [sic]."
FONER, supra note 108, at 119 (quoting letter from Alfred Dockery to R. J. Powell (Nov. 13,
1865)). See also Freedmen's Bureau Online, supra note 170.
172 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27-30 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1991)).
173 See, e.g., William E. Mahoney, Jr., Comment, Section 1981 and Discriminatory
Discharge: A ContextualAnalysis, 64 TEMPLE L. REv. 173, 202 (1991).
174 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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rights protected under the Civil Rights Act.
With the passage of the Civil Rights Act, Congress explicitly linked
protection of the freedmen from discriminatory application of state law with
the protection of federal court review through habeas corpus. This was clear
from the Civil Rights Act's protection of physical liberty, requiring "full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.' ' 75 In
providing for "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person," Congress was granting the freed slaves the protection of
federal court review of unlawful detentions, through removal and habeas
corpus review. Section 3 of this act makes this clear:
And be it further enacted, That the district courts of the United States,
within their respective districts, shall have, exclusively of the courts of the
several States, cognizance ... concurrently with the circuit courts of the
United States, of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are
denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State or
locality where they may be any of the rights secured to them by the first
section of this act; and if any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal, has
been or shall be commenced in any State court, against any such person,
for any cause whatsoever, . . . such defendant shall have the right to
remove such cause for trial to the proper district or circuit court in the
manner prescribed by the "Act relating to habeas corpus and regulating
judicial proceedings in certain cases," approved March three, eighteen
hundred and sixty-three, and all acts amendatory thereof1
76
Some scholars have focused on the removal provisions of the above-
quoted section of the Civil Rights Act.177 Clearly, removal to federal court
was provided for under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 and was
incorporated by the Civil Rights Act. The Civil Rights Act, however,
invoked both the 1863 act "and all acts amendatory thereof' while granting
federal courts "cognizance ... of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting
persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals
171 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27-30 (1866) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991)). The Freedmen's Bureau was understood to be temporary, so
Congress adopted the Civil Rights Act, ordaining federal habeas corpus as the preferred
method of freeing someone being held pursuant to a race-based application of state process
and law.
176 Id. § 3.
177 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally
Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State
Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793 (1965).
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of the State... any of the rights secured to them by the first section of this
act.' ' 178 Congress provided both removal and habeas review. Removal is a
remedy that substitutes a forum for trial, rather than providing review after
trial. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 provided relief in both forms.
Defendants could obtain removal before or during a trial in which the state
court failed to adequately protect federal guarantees 179 and seek de novo
review subsequent to state-court proceedings. 180
Congress clarified this intent when it amended the Habeas Corpus Act
one month after passage of the Civil Rights Act, specifically providing for
habeas corpus review after the final judgment on proceedings in state
court.18' Since the language of the Civil Rights Act specifically references
both the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, "and all acts amendatory thereof" as
providing the mechanism of federal court jurisdiction over these cases, the
amended Habeas Corpus Act was undoubtedly meant to provide federal
habeas corpus review of claims cognizable under the Civil Rights Act of
1866.
These acts, passed in 1866, presaged the further expansion of habeas
corpus power ten months after passage of the Civil Rights Act.' 8 2 Congress
articulated this habeas power of review even more clearly,183 extending
federal review "to all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States." 8 4 As will be discussed more fully, the habeas provisions in the 1867
178 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1991)).
179 Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (1863).
IS0 Id. at 757. ("[Aind the said circuit court shall thereupon proceed to try and
determine the facts and the law in such action, in the same manner as if the same had been
there origmally commenced, the judgment in such case notwithstanding.").
"' Act of May 11, 1866, 39th Cong., Sess. I, ch. 80 (1866). The full title of the act is
"An Act to Amend an Act Entitled 'An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating
Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases,' approved March third, eighteen-hundred and sixty-
three." This often neglected Habeas Corpus Act of 1866 provided for federal habeas corpus
review of state-court convictions deemed to offend the Civil Rights Act.
182 The amended Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 80, § 3, 14 Stat. 385 (1867), must be
read in conjunction with Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (1867), which was
approved on the same day. The acts together expand habeas jurisdiction to "all cases where
any person may be restrained of his or her liberty, in violation of the constitution, or of any
treaty or law of the United States." Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
Technically, the expansion of habeas corpus under the Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 1 Star.
385 (1867), was not an act amendatory of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 and is not
discussed as such here. There was an act passed that same day that did amend the 1863 Act.
See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 1 Stat. 385 (1867).
'" Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 385, 385 (1867).
184 id.
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act would more expansively cover claims arising after ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 
1 8 5
B. States' Reactions to the Civil Rights Act of 1866
Once again, the states reacted with predictable hostility to what they
viewed as federal intervention in local affairs, and they continued to pass
Black Codes, albeit with more carefully scripted "race-neutral" language.
The relative sophistication of the legislative response did not signal a
correlative moderation in enforcement or brutality.
If employers could no longer subject blacks to corporal punishment:
[Courts] could mandate whipping as a punishment for vagrancy or petty
theft. If individual whites could no longer hold blacks in involuntary
servitude, courts could sentence freedmen to long prison terms, force them
to labor without compensation on public works, or bind them out to white
employers who would pay their fines. The convict lease system, moreover,
which had originated on a small scale before the war, was expanded so as
to provide employers with a supply of cheap labor. In Texas in 1867,
blacks constituted about one third of the convicts confined to the state
penitentiary, but nearly 90 percent of those leased out for railroad labor.
18 6
Apprenticeship laws also were embraced with increasing vigor
throughout the South. In some states, such as Maryland and North Carolina,
courts ordered black children to be bound for labor to white "employers"
without the permission or knowledge of the children's parents. 8 7 Records
compiled by the Freedmen's Bureau in those states indicate a virtual deluge
of requests for assistance in obtaining the freedom of children enslaved
through "lawful" state-court action. 8 8 Of course, the state-court actions in
these cases were inconsistent with federal law, and the resulting involuntary
servitude of these children was a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.
The aggressive state action against the freedmen was deeply unsettling to
Republicans in Congress not only due to the extent of abuse, but also due to
the role being played by the state courts established under Presidential
Reconstruction:
In much of the South, the courts of Presidential Reconstruction appeared
185 For a more complete discussion of the history of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, see
infra Part II.C.3.
186 FONER, supra note 108, at 205; see also J. THORSTEN SELLIN, SLAVERY AND THE
PENAL SYSTEM 145-62 (1976); A.' Elizabeth Taylor, The Origins and Development of the
Convict Lease System in Georgia, 26 GA. HIST. Q. 113, 113-15 (1942).
187 See FONER, supra note 108, at 201.
188 See id.
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more interested in disciplining the black population and forcing it to labor
than in dispensing justice. "The fact is," one of Florida's few white
Radicals commented shrewdly early in 1867, "custom with them [local
whites] has become the law."
'1 89
Congressional Republicans lost faith not only in President Johnson's
commitment to Reconstruction but also in the willingness or capability of
state courts to protect the rights of freed blacks. This belief in the failure of
Presidential Reconstruction and state courts would shift the center of gravity
in the Republican Party toward the radical wing of that party.1 90
The Radical Republican agenda was defined by a much more aggressive
approach to ensuring the equality of freed blacks. Radicals were agitating for
greater political rights for freedmen and, as is evident by the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, for greater federal protection of personal liberty and property.
191
The continued resistance to federal control over the liberty of freed blacks
swelled the ranks of those embracing the Radical agenda. This political
movement was fueled in part by continuing reports of violence and
lawlessness being sanctioned by state courts:
Arrested by white sheriffs, tried before white judges and juries, blacks
understandably had little confidence in the courts of Presidential
Reconstruction. There, a group of Charleston blacks complained early in
1867, "justice is mocked and injustice is clothed in the garb of
righteousness."
192
Reports from Freedmen's Bureau officials echoed those of Southern
blacks. "Blacks, a [Freedmen's] Bureau official concluded, 'would be just as
well off with no law at all or no Government,' as with the legal system of
Presidential Reconstruction."'' 93 Bureau officials believed that blacks would
be "just as well off with no law" because the state courts were helping to
enslave black children, in a manner that was consistent with state law but
offensive to the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act. Even by
1867, Bureau agents and local justices of the peace released black youth
from apprenticeships. 1
94
189 Id. at 205; see also JERRELL H. SHOFNER, NOR IS IT OVER YET 105 (1974); H.R. REP.
No. 30 at 272 (1865-66).
190 FONER, supra note 108, at 238.
.1 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1991)).
192 FONER, supra note 108, at 205.
.93 Letter from Nelson G. Gill to 0. 0. Howard (Oct. 14, 1866), quotedin FONER, supra
note 108, at 205.
194 FONER, supra note 108, at 201.
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While the Civil Rights Act forbade this form of racial discrimination,
hostile courts interpreted race-neutral state statutes as constitutional and
enforced their provisions. 19 "[]t was well understood, as Alabama planter
and Democratic politico John W. DuBois [sic] later remarked, that 'the
vagrant contemplated was the plantation negro. ""9' With neither the Civil
Rights Act nor Presidential Reconstruction serving to protect the rights of
the freedmen, Congress, increasingly dominated by proponents of the
Radical Republican agenda, moved to constitutionalize the redistribution of
power to determine the lawfulness of race-based deprivations of liberty
within our federal system.
C. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privilege of Habeas Corpus
In response to the ongoing recalcitrance of the Southern states and the
failure of Presidential Reconstruction to counter the assertions of antebellum
notions of federalism effectively, Congress proposed the Fourteenth
Amendment. Congress passed the joint resolution proposing the Fourteenth
Amendment to the states on June 16, 1866.197 It would be ratified and
become part of the Constitution in July of 1868. Through the amendment's
Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Framers intended to constitutionalize
the process for securing the liberty of the freed race and place it beyond the
power of state legislatures and courts. The previously fluctuating federalism
balance solidified and changed in one specific way: states no longer retained
the ability to determine whether it was lawful to deprive a person of liberty
based upon race, and the privilege of habeas corpus, a privilege of federal
citizenship, would ensure that federal courts would have the last say.
Reading the Fourteenth Amendment along with the other enactments passed
by Congress at this time, including the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, the
Reconstruction Act of 1867, and the Judiciary Act of 1867, compels this
conclusion.
There are two points that the historical record clearly establishes. The
195 See Stephen Plass, Dualism and Overlooked Class Consciousness in American
Labor Laws, 37 Hous. L. REv. 823, 841-43 (2000).
196 FONER, supra note 108, at 201, quoting JOHN W. DuBOSE, ALABAMA'S TRAGIC
DtLADE 55 (James K. Greer ed., 1940).
197 The joint resolution submitting the Fourteenth Amendment to the states passed the
Senate on June 8, 1866 and the House of Representatives on June 13, 1866. CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1 st Sess. 3148-49, 3042 (1866). This action followed slightly more than two
months after Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866. This might seem like too short a
time for Congress to have assessed the reaction to that Act. But, as one of the leading
Radicals in Congress observed: "These are no times of ordinary politics .... These are
formative hours: the national purpose and thought grows and ripens in thirty days as much as
ordinary years bring it forward." Letter from Wendell Phillips to Charles Sumner (Mar. 24,
1866), cited in FONER, supra note 108, at 239.
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first is that the Fourteenth Amendment was primarily concerned with
protecting the freed slaves. 198 The second is that among the privileges or
immunities of federal citizenship is the privilege of habeas corpus.' 99 What is
somewhat astonishing is that the import of these two points has remained
largely unrecognized. Scholars and judges alike have interpreted the
Supreme Court's Slaughter-House ruling as one which eviscerated the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.200 While criticism that the Court
unjustifiably narrowed the scope of the privileges or immunities of federal
citizenship is valid, Slaughter-House did nothing to diminish the primary
purpose of that clause. A careful reading of the amendment within its
historical context confirms that the original intent of the Framers was to
protect the liberty of freed slaves by explicitly providing in the Constitution
recourse to the privilege of federal habeas corpus.
1. Interpreting the Amendment
Any serious analysis of a constitutional provision, of course, must begin
with the language of that provision. Interpretation of any clause must, where
possible, be read as consistent with the larger constitutional framework.
While the normal rule of construction should be applied to analyzing the
Fourteenth Amendment, there remains ambiguity in the language, ambiguity
that is not rendered clear by resort to the legislative history. Scholars who
have examined this history have reached strongly divergent conclusions.
20 1
This difference of opinion concerning the Framers' intent in drafting the
amendment cannot be resolved by looking exclusively at the Congressional
Globe, for many of the statements are contradictory. The debate over this
issue has, at times, become quite heated.20 2 The Framers' intent, however,
must be analyzed within its historical context. Doing otherwise is separating
198 See, e.g., AMAR, CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 2, at 162; see also
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
199 See 83 U.S. at 79-80; 83 U.S. at 115 (Bradley, J., dissenting); see also 83 U.S. at
96-98 (Field, J. dissenting) (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)
(No. 3,230), for appropriate delineation of privileges and immunities, which includes habeas
corpus among them).
200 See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The Politics of Separation: Review of Philip
Hamburger's Separation of Church and State, 36 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 967, 987 (2003); see
also Larry Cati Backer, Race, "The Race" and the Republic: Reconceiving Judicial
Authority After Bush v. Gore, 51 CATH. U. L. REv. 1057 n.143 (2002).
201 Compare AMAR, supra note 2, with Berger, supra note 28. In recent years, members
of the Supreme Court have indicated a willingness to revisit the scope of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, if not reexamine the holding of the Slaughter-House Cases. See Saenz v.
Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
202 Compare AMAR, supra note 2, with Berger, supra note 28.
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analysis from reason.
The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment reads as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No. State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.20 3
The analysis in this article will focus primarily on this clause, examining its
plain meaning and its relationship to the rest Of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the larger Constitution, as illuminated by the historical contextual
evidence of the Framers' intent.
a. Citizenship
The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment defines citizenship.
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. ' '204 The plain meaning of the clause is to define citizenship
broadly to include "all persons, born or naturalized in the United States"
irrespective of race. This language contradicts several clauses of the original
Constitution, through implication and interpretation, rather than by direct
force of contradictory language. This sentence was designed to conflict with
the "Three-Fifths' Clause" of Article I, § 2 and the Fugitive Slave Clause of
Article IV. These original constitutional provisions were obviously intended
to yield to the latter. This fact is not disputed by scholars or courts and is
readily discernible from the historical record. The language of this first
sentence was explicitly designed to overturn the Supreme Court's definition
of citizenship articulated in Dred Scott.20 5 Dred Scott denied the status of
Illinois citizenship to a slave who had traveled with his slave owner into the
free state of Illinois and then to a territory of the United States (present-day
Minnesota), before returning to the slave state of Missouri. 6 The Court, in
so fuling, distinguished between personhood and citizenship, the distinction
used by the Framers of the original Constitution.2 7 While many have
criticized the Dred Scott decision as morally indefensible, the decision was
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.204 id.
205 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856).
2o6 Id. at 427.
207 Id. at 404.
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not without constitutional support. Several provisions of the original
Constitution lend credibility to the decision. Both the "Three-Fifths clause,"
which distinguished between personhood and citizenship, and the Fugitive
Slave Clause support the legal definition of a slave as something less than
fully human-as property of an owner.208 Based upon the slavery provisions
of the original Constitution and the federalism balance enshrined therein, the
Supreme Court held that a free state could not define citizenship to include
slaves taken as property into that state.20 9 In doing so, the Court explicitly
referenced how the privileges or immunities of citizenship would interfere
with the application of race-based criminal laws.
[I]t cannot be believed that the large slaveholding States regarded them as
included in the word citizens, or would have consented to a Constitution
which might compel them to receive them in that character from another
State. For if they were so received, and entitled to the privileges and
immunities of citizens, it would exempt them from the operation of the
special laws and from the police regulations which they considered to be
necessary for their own safety. It would give to persons of the negro race,
who were recognized as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right to
enter every other State whenever they pleased, singly or in companies,
without pass or passport, and without obstruction, to sojourn there as long
as they pleased, to go where they pleased at every hour of the day or night
without molestation, unless they committed some violation of law for
which a white man would be punished .... 21
Taney's decision, however, went even further. Referring to the
compromises reached by the Framers of the original Constitution, Taney
found that people of African descent "had no rights which the white man
was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be
reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an
ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever profit could be made
by it ... ,,2 The Dred Scott Court proceeded to declare the Missouri
208 While Chief Justice Taney deserves criticism for the Dred Scott decision, he did not
author these provisions of the Constitution. Nor was he the first to describe the enslaved race
as comprised of beings with attributes of property. Federalist No. 54 discusses whether
slaves are property or human beings, and its author concludes: "Let the compromising
expedient of the Constitution be mutually adopted which regards them as inhabitants, but as
debased by servitude below the equal level of free inhabitants, which regards the slave as
divested of two fifths of the man." THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 284 (James Madison) (George
W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
209 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 416. Moreover, the decision prohibited a state from making
any person of African descent a citizen.
2101d. at 416-17.
21 Id. at 407.
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Compromise an unconstitutional infringement upon the property rights of
slave holders, making explicit reference to both the Fugitive Slave Clause
and the original limitation upon Congress' ability to prohibit the importation
of slaves into any state.
2
The Dred Scott ruling galvanized much of Northern public opinion and
led to fiercer opposition to the expansion of slavery.213 This decision would
become a rallying cry for abolitionists and instrumental both in Abraham
Lincoln's run for the presidency and in his formation of constitutional
theory, evidenced in his historic "House Divided" speech.2 14 So, when the
opportunity presented itself, with the first words of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress took careful aim at Dred Scott's definition of
citizenship. To hit their target, however, they had to cut the entwined strands
of slavery and federalism which still fettered this nation to the ugly spectacle
of human bondage.
b. Privileges or Immunities
The Fourteenth Amendment attacked the federalism-bound slavery
provisions of the Constitution in its second sentence. "No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 215 While focusing on the first
clause of this sentence, this discussion will not, as it should not, divorce this
clause from the rest of the sentence, the rest of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the historical context in which the Framers of this amendment were
acting.
As noted above, the dialogue surrounding the Privileges or Immunities
Clause is both robust and relevant.2 16 However, by examining the areas of
agreement among the debaters and applying the essential means of
constitutional interpretation outlined above, it becomes clear that the central
purpose of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was to shift from the states to
the federal government the power to determine the lawfulness of
deprivations of liberty alleged to be based upon the newly impermissible
212 
Id. at 451-52.
213 See e.g., Africans in America, Part 4, Dred Scott's Fight for Freedom, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4p2932.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005); see also Lisa
Cozzens, A Hard Shove for a "Nation On the Brink": Impact of Dred Scott, at
http://odur.let.rug.nl/-usa/E/dred scott/ scottOl .htm (last modified May 22, 2003).
214 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, A House Divided: Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 16,
1858), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 461 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
215 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
216 See Amar, supra note 28; Berger, supra note 28.
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classification of race. One of the principle ways the Framers of this
amendment sought to protect this new distribution of power over the issue of
slavery was that weapon used for centuries to set the demarcations of power
in intragovernmental struggles: the writ of habeas corpus.
That the Fourteenth Amendment was primarily designed to protect the
freed slaves is not readily disputable; no serious scholar or jurist contends
otherwise. It is both the extent of this new protection and the manner in
which it was to be assured that generate controversy. At a minimum,
scholars and the courts agree that the Framers were concerned about
protecting the liberty of the newly freed slaves. While there exists a
significant body of evidence from which one could conclude that the
Framers intended the Fourteenth Amendment to protect against state
interference with a broader array of rights,21 7 the arguments supporting this
position are not airtight.2"' This debate, however, need not be resolved to
conclude that the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge race-based
deprivations of liberty was included as one of the privileges of federal
citizenship that states could not abridge.2 19
The language of this second sentence forbids states from making or
enforcing any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of U.S.
citizens. This language on its face is neither detailed, nor particularly clear.
There are some meanings, however, that we can derive from the language
itself. The first lessons we can draw are from the other uses of the terms
"privilege" and "immunity" in the Constitution. The most obvious place to
begin this textual analysis is with the original Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV.220 This provision is very similar to that found in the
Fourteenth Amendment, but with some important differences. 22 1 The
217 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 28; AMAR, supra note 2, at 215-3 1; see also Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 84-111 (1872) (Field, J. dissenting); 83 U.S. at 111-24 (Bradley,
J., dissenting) (arguing for broader incorporation of rights against the states).
218 Amar, supra note 28, at 1260-62.
219 Given the breadth of the language used in the amendment, one could also argue that
the prohibition against the states forbidding abridgement of the privileges or immunities of
federal citizenship extends more broadly to provide a general protection of federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction. See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 66. However, that is not the purpose of this
article. The history of slavery, civil war, and constitutional amendment are indisputably
concerned with securing the liberty of a racial minority whose members were being held in
bondage pursuant to state law. This specific concern was the primary focus of the Framers
and the one that must be embraced.
220 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. This is the only other place in the Constitution that
the word "immunity" or "immunities" appears. The word "privilege," however, is found
elsewhere; in the specific reference to the "privilege of the writ of habeas corpus" in U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, el. 2.
221 The significant differences lie in the Fourteenth Amendment's articulation of the
Privileges or Immunities offederal citizenship (and in the prohibition against abridging this
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Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment chose to use the nearly identical
phrase to that of the "privileges and immunities" clause, which was already
found in Article IV of the Constitution.222 The nineteenth-century
understanding of the original privileges and immunities clause, therefore, is
critical to any analysis of the Framers' intent in adopting the nearly identical
phrase in the 1860s.
There is ample evidence from the nineteenth century that when the term
"privileges and immunities" was discussed, the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus was uniformly regarded as being among those privileges. In
Corfield v. Coryell, the court defined the privileges and immunities of state
citizenship as including, inter alia, habeas corpus. 223 The Corfield decision is
particularly important not only because it identifies habeas corpus as a
privilege of citizenship, but also because it helps identify the exalted place
that habeas corpus occupied in the minds of nineteenth-century lawmakers
and judges. Like the eighteenth-century Framers of our Constitution who
enshrined the writ as a nearly inviolable privilege, nineteenth-centuryjurists
esteemed the Great Writ so highly as to include it along with inalienable
natural rights.224
privilege) and Article IV's protection of state citizenship. Both will be discussed in greater
detail.
222 The Fourteenth Amendment uses the disjunctive, rather than the conjunctive in
referencing privileges or immunities; conversely, Article IV uses the conjunctive. This
difference appears to be grammatical and not substantive. The provision in Article V speaks
in positive terms of entitlement: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis
added). As such, it secures the privileges and immunities to the citizens of each state. In
contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment's language is prohibitory, forbidding states from
"abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). Both clauses, therefore, were designed to ensure that
citizens enjoy both the privileges and immunities of citizenship without interference.
223 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
224 The "full" list of privileges and immunities detailed in Corfield includes the
following:
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness
and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly
- prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to
pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture,
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to
take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from
higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; may be
mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which
are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be
fundamental: to which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and
established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised.
These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking,
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The Corfield decision was commonly known and, in fact, was discussed
by the Framers in debating the Fourteenth Amendment. 225 Some of the
Framers considered the privileges and immunities of federal citizenship to
226consist largely of natural rights, 6 while others clearly anticipated a much
broader range of federal rights being made applicable against the states
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Nevertheless, all included the
privilege of habeas corpus among those privileges adopted.227
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were well aware of the
important role that habeas corpus played in the struggle over slavery. Many
of them had been intensively involved in the abolitionist movement.228 These
men had chafed over the Supreme Court's ruling in Dred Scott. They not
only disagreed with the morality of that decision, but they certainly
understood the importance of how the Court had reached its decision. It is
important to note that Dred Scott was a trespass vi et armis action decided on
jurisdictional grounds.229 Scott, along with his wife and children, was denied
his freedom because he lacked standing to sue for his release in federal
court. In framing the issue before the Supreme Court in Dred Scott, Chief
Justice Taney defined the ability to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal
courts as one of the privileges and immunities of citizenship, which Scott
lacked:
The question is simply this: Can a Negro, whose ancestors were imported
into this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political
community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the
United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and the
privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citizen?
One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States
privileges and immunities ....
Id. at 551-52. This list is incomplete, as the court specifically stated that there were "many
others" and that a detailed listing would be "more tedious than difficult to enumerate."Id at
551.
225 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866).
226 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115-19, 1757, 1832,2765, 2542-43
(1866).
227 id.
228 See, e.g., FONER, supra note 108, at 228-29, for discussion of the role abolitionists
played in the Republican-controlled Congress that drafted the Civil War Amendments.
Thaddeus Stevens, one of the leaders of the Radical Republicans, helped draft the
amendment. He was a famous, longstanding abolitionist, having represented many fugitive
slaves in his law practice before coming to Congress. Others such as Henry Wilson, Horace
Greeley, and Lynum Trumbull are just a few with long abolitionist careers before coming to
office. See id.229Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (reporter's note).
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in the cases specified in the Constitution.
2 30
The Dred Scott case was not a habeas corpus proceeding because it was
an action brought against a private defendant. Nonetheless, the type of action
in Dred Scott, a trespass vi et armis, is closely related to a petition for writ of
habeas corpus, as is made clear by Blackstone's commentaries. Blackstone,
in discussing habeas corpus, describes the trespass vi et armis as the
appropriate remedy for false imprisonment in cases where the writ of habeas
corpus is unavailable. 23' The Court's language, however, was not limited to
actions in trespass vi et arm is, but to "the privilege of suing in a court of the
United States in the cases specified in the Constitution." 232 Of course, one of
the "privileges" of suing in federal court that is explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution is the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.233
It is indisputable that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were
reversing the Supreme Court's definition of citizenship with the first
sentence of the first clause of that amendment. They did not forget about
Dred Scott when they wrote the next sentence. They also understood that, by
conferring citizenship on the former slaves, they were granting them the
privilege of invoking federal court jurisdiction over those cases specified in
234
the Constitution, including the privilege of habeas corpus. The Framers,
however, were well aware that the privilege of federal habeas corpus could
be effectively denied to freed slaves being "lawfully" imprisoned under the
state laws of vagrancy and idleness. This was due to the Thirteenth
Amendment's exception permitting involuntary servitude upon conviction
for a crime. It is this loophole at which they aimed the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Without the express prohibition against state
abridgement of this privilege, states would be free to continue flouting the
spirit of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
The Framers' intent to provide procedural protections to the liberty of
newly freed slaves is made abundantly clear by viewing the Privileges or
230 60 U.S. at 403.
231 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, ch. 8, available at http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalon/blackstone/bk3ch8.hti.
232 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 403.
233 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it." Id.
234 The Congressional Globe and the popular press during the ratification period reveal
that providing the freed slaves with access to the courts was one of the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115-19, 1757,
1832, 2765-66, 2542-43 (1866); CHICAGO TRiBuNE CAMPAIGN Doc., June 30, 1866, at 9
(quoting the speech of General John Logan, a leading Republican: "The rights of a citizen
are to sue and be sued, to own property, to have process of court, to have protection of life,
liberty and property").
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Immunities Clause in context. This context is provided not only by the rest
of the Fourteenth Amendment but by the other actions of the same Congress
that drafted this amendment.235 The first place one can find additional
support for this proposition is by looking at those words standing in closest
proximity to the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The remaining clauses in
this sentence make clear the Framers' intent: "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws., 236 The
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are
separated by a semi-colon from the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Although they are contained in the same sentence, courts and scholars often
discuss them as if they exist worlds apart from each other. While not
synonymous, these clauses are related in important ways. When read
together, in conjunction with the first sentence of the amendment, these two
sentences clearly and forcefully bespeak of intent to place the liberty
interests of freedmen on equal footing with those of white citizens. With
equal clarity, these sentences tell us of the Framers' intent to provide these
newly freed citizens with procedural protections to prevent state law from
interfering with this newly granted liberty.
2. Shifting the Balance of Federalism Regarding Race-Based
Deprivations ofLiberty
Some have argued that the Framers never intended to alter the
237federalism balance so greatly. Instead, these authors claim that the Radical
Republicans in Congress were self-interested miscreants, not truly
concerned for the welfare of the slaves but bent upon revenge against former
238colleagues with whom they had a political dispute. The notion that the
Framers were political opportunists who were unconcerned with the well-
being of those enslaved, however, has long since been refuted by credible
historians as an attempt to "whitewash" the horrific nature of a society
whose economic and social structure depended upon the enslavement of an
235 The details of the Civil Rights Act have already been discussed, as has its
relationship to the Fourteenth Amendment. There are other pieces of legislation that also
help to define the Framers' intent with regard to the Privileges or Immunities Clause. These
include the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, the Reconstruction Act of 1867, and the Judiciary
Act of 1867. These enactments will be discussed in more detail.
236 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
23 7 See, e.g., Lawrence H. Cook, Waste Not, Wait Not-A Consideration ofFederal and
State Jurisdiction, 49 FORDHAM L. R v. 895, 900 (198 1).
238 See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Searching for the Intent of the Framers of [sic]
Fourteenth Amendment, 5 CONN. L. REv. 368, 372 (1973).
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entire race of human beings. 239 As historian Eric Foner states, "Rather than
vengeance, the driving force of Radical ideology was the utopian vision of a
nation whose citizens enjoyed equality of civil and political rights, secured
by a powerful and beneficent national state. 240 Whatever one may think of
the Radical conception of the federal government as benign, it is hard to
dispute the historical evidence that this was in fact the ideal.
• With the equality of former slaves paramount to Radicals, other political
interests received less sympathy, including notions of federalism favoring
states' rights. The Radicals believed that advocates of states' rights were
obstacles to a Reconstruction plan that would adequately protect the rights of
the newly freed black citizens. Although this position was initially
unpopular, even within the Republican Party, the Radical agenda became
increasingly associated with a more powerful national government, necessary
for protecting the rights of black citizens.24' The Radicals recognized that
what they were calling for required others to accept a stark departure from
established norms. Yet, they had traveled a lonely path before, only to find
others persuaded to the righteousness of their cause.242
In securing the privileges or immunities of federal citizenship against
any state encroachment, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment made
clear their rejection of antebellum notions of federalism. At least insofar as
those of African descent were concerned, states would no longer be able to
decide the lawfulness of an individual's detention, when that detention was
alleged to be based upon race.243 This fact becomes even clearer when
239 See, efg., FONER, supra note 108, at 228-42; see also Robert J. Kaczorowski,
Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 863, 875-80 (1986).
24 FONER, supra note 108, at 230.
241 Id. at 230-32.
242 Id. at 239:
Time and again, Radicals had staked out unpopular positions, only to be
vindicated by events. Uncompromising opposition to slavery's expansion,
emancipation, the arming of black troops-all enjoyed little support when first
proposed, yet all had come to be embraced by the mainstream of Republican
opinion .... Everyone knew the Radicals were prepared for renewed agitation.
Whatever the merits of legal and political equality for blacks, a correspondent of
moderate Ohio Sen. John Sherman noted, "if you reconstruct upon any principle
short of this, you ... cause a continuous political strife which will last until the
thing is obtained."
Id. (quoting letter from Thomas Richmond to John Sherman (Feb. 27, 1866)).
243 Although the freed slaves were clearly the group that motivated the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is clear from the debate in Congress that the Framers of that
Amendment believed it to cover Other minorities, including "Chinamen," but not American
Indians. Similar wide-reaching language in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 caused President
Johnson to veto the bill. See CONG. GLOBE, Mar. 27, 1866, at 279 85, reprinting Veto
Message of President Johnson, SENATE J., Mar. 27, 1866.
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examining the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 and related legislation Congress
passed at this time.
3. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867
As alluded to briefly in Part II.A.2, the bill which would eventually
become the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 was initially referred to the House
Judiciary Committee by the House one day after the Thirteenth Amendment
became law.2"A This bill was referred to the Committee specifically
to inquire and report to the House, as soon as practicable, by bill or
otherwise, what legislation is necessary to enable the courts of the United
States to enforce the freedom of the wives and children of soldiers of the
United States under the joint resolution of March 3, 1865, and also to
enforce the liberty of all persons under the operation of the constitutional
amendment abolishing slavery.
2 45
What emerged from the Judiciary Committee was a "bill to secure the
writ of Habeas Corpus to persons held in slavery or involuntary servitude
contrary to the Constitution of the United States. 2 46 This bill and its
subsequent history in becoming the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, make clear
that Congress saw habeas corpus as indispensable to the protection of those
recently emancipated from state encroachment upon their liberty. The history
of this Act has been referred to as the "process by which the constitutional
prohibition of chattel slavery was translated into actual emancipation.,
247
The manner in which this original proposal became the final product, the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, is instructive and important to understanding
the implications of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The bill originally
contained an exception identical to one in the Thirteenth Amendment,
248permitting involuntary servitude upon conviction for a crime. In all other
cases of someone held in slavery or involuntary servitude, habeas corpus was
the method provided to discharge them.249 Given the critical roles habeas
244 Mayers, supra note 148, at 31-34.
245 Id. at 34. This resolution was dated December 19, 1865.
246 id.
241 Id. at 32.
248 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 87(1865); see also Mayers, supra note 148,
at 34.
249 See Mayers, supra note 148, at 34. As Professor Mayers has pointed out, when the
bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee, it read:
Be it enacted ... that all persons who are held in slavery or involuntary
servitude otherwise than for crime whereof they are convicted shall be discharged
on Habeas Corpus issued by and returnable before any court or judge of the
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corpus played for different camps throughout the struggle over slavery, it
made sense that Congress' first choice of weapon to secure the release of
emancipated slaves still held in bondage was the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
The bill, however, would not make it out of committee in this form.
While debate on the Habeas Corpus Act's amendment was pending,
Congress attempted to use the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 to provide relief
for those imprisoned under the Black Codes. To accomplish this task,
Congress passed an amendment to the Freedmen's Bureau Act in February
of 1866. This act was vetoed by President Johnson.2 50 The Radical
Republicans regrouped in April of 1866 and passed the Civil Rights Act
("CRA") of 1866-this time overriding President Johnson's veto25' and
guaranteeing "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person .... ,,252 In section 3 of the CRA, Congress made clear
that it provided habeas corpus review of all civil or criminal cases involving
the denial of any rights secured by that act and of any matters arising from
actions done in conformity with the Freedmen's Bureau Act.253
In passing the CRA, Congress explicitly referenced the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1863 as the mechanism for federal court review of violations under
the CRA.254 Recognizing that revisions of the Habeas Corpus Act were
under consideration, Congress included a provision for incorporating "all
acts amendatory" of the 1863 act.255 While the CRA provided a "punishment
for crime" exception to the prohibition against unequal application of the
law, that exception did not apply to deprivations inflicted upon an individual
"by reason of his color or race. ' ' 56 The relevant provisions of the CRA,
however, were drafted in an artless manner. Section 1 of the act purported to
United States; and if the court or judge refuse the discharge the petitioner may
forthwith appeal to the Supreme Court, which court if then sitting or if not at its
next term shall hear the case on the first motion day after the appeal is docketed
and discharge the petitioner if he shall appear to be held in slavery or involuntary
servitude contrary to the constitution of the United States.
Id. He also notes that the bill was never printed. See id at 34 n. 16.
250 See Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Formulating Reparations Litigation Through the Eyes of the
Movement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 457, 460 (2003).
251 See CONG. GLOBE, March 27, 1866, at 279-85, reprinting Veto Message of
President Johnson, SENATE J., March 27, 1866.
252 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1991)).
253 § 3.
254 "[S]uch defendant shall have the right to remove such cause for trial to the proper
district or circuit court in the manner prescribed by the 'Act relating to habeas corpus and
regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases,' approved March three, eighteen hundred
and sixty-three, and all acts amendatory thereof." § 3.
255 § 3.
256 § 2.
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confer citizenship and grant rights available to all persons, save those duly
convicted of a crime.257 Section 2 of the CRA punished those who deny
equal application of this law "by reason of... race or color," irrespective of
criminal conviction.
8
State reactions to the CRA, detailed in Part.II.B, stirred Congress to
propose the Fourteenth Amendment. The use of facially neutral criminal
statutes to circumvent the spirit of the Thirteenth Amendment and the CRA
impressed upon the Republican-controlled Congress the need to alter
permanently the federalism balance concerning authority over race-based
denials of liberty.25 9 The result of this strengthened determination took the
form of the Fourteenth Amendment,26 ° the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,61
and the Reconstruction Act of 1867.262
The Fourteenth Amendment was proposed to the states on June 16,
1866.263 Great hostility followed the passage of this proposed amendment in
Congress. That hostility came from many quarters, but it was particularly
virulent in the Southern states and the White House. President Johnson,
having no formal role in the process of amending the Constitution,
nevertheless denounced the proposed amendment in the strongest of
terms. 264 He suggested that Congress had no authority to propose
amendments while Southern states remained unrepresented in Congress.
265
266
Most Southern states initially refused to ratify the amendment. With such
257 § 1.
258 § 2.
259 See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
260 U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
261 Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
262 Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867).
263 See 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, at http://www.nps.gov/malu/
documents/amend. 14.htm (last updated Oct. 25, 1997).
264 See, e.g., The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, The History of the Impeachment
ofAndrew Johnson, at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/treatise/andrewjohnsonj ohnson
.htm, for a discussion of President Johnson's opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment and
the role of his position during his subsequent impeachment.
265 See id.
266 Although the amendment was proposed to the states on June 16, 1866, it was not
ratified by the necessary three-fourths of the states until July 21, 1868. Westlaw reports the
history of ratification of the Amendment as follows:
On July 21, 1868, Congress adopted and transmitted to the Department of State a
concurrent resolution, declaring that 'the legislatures of the States ofConnecticut,
Tennessee, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, New York, Ohio, Illinois, West
Virginia, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, Missouri, Indiana, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, Iowa, Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Alabama,
South Carolina, and Louisiana, being three-fourths and more ofthe several States
of the Union, have ratified the fourteenth article of amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, duly proposed by two-thirds of each House of the Thirty-
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strong initial opposition to the proposed Amendment, Republicans in
Congress realized that additional measures were necessary to protect the
freedmen. On July 16, 1866, one month after proposing the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress passed a second amendment to the Freedmen's
26726Bureau Act. President Johnson, not surprisingly, vetoed this act as well.26t
Congressional reaction was swift; both houses approved the act over the
president's veto the same day he exercised it.
269
This act provided for the freedmen "full and equal benefits of all laws
and proceedings concerning personal liberty," and for the first time Congress
did not exempt from that benefit those who had previously been convicted of
270a crime. In fact, the act specifically called for military protection and
jurisdiction
over all cases and questions concerning the free enjoyment of such
immunities and rights, and no penalty or punishment for any violation of
law shall be imposed or permitted because of race or color, or previous
condition of slavery, other or greater than the penalty or punishment to
which white persons may be liable by law for the like offense.27'
Passed one month after Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, this
ninth Congress: Therefore, Resolved, That said fourteenth article is hereby
declared to be a part of the Constitution of the United States, and it shall be duly
promulgated as such by the Secretary of State.' The Secretary of State accordingly
issued a proclamation, dated July 28, 1868, declaring that the proposed fourteenth
amendment had been ratified by the legislatures of thirty of the thirty-six States.
The amendment was ratified by the State Legislatures on the following dates:
Connecticut, June 25, 1866; New Hampshire, July 6, 1866; Tennessee, July 19,
1866; New Jersey, Sept. 11, 1866; Oregon, Sept. 19, 1866; Vermont, Oct. 30,
1866; Ohio, Jan. 4, 1867; New York, Jan. 10, 1867; Kansas, Jan. 11, 1867;
Illinois, Jan. 15, 1867; West Virginia, Jan. 16, 1867; Michigan, Jan. 16, 1867;
Minnesota, Jan. 16, 1867; Maine, Jan. 19, 1867; Nevada, Jan. 22, 1867; Indiana,
Jan. 23, 1867; Missouri, Jan. 25, 1867; Rhode Island, Feb. 7, 1867; Wisconsin,
Feb. 7, 1867; Pennsylvania, Feb. 12, 1867; Massachusetts, Mar. 20, 1867;
Nebraska, June 15, 1867; Iowa, Mar. 16, 1868; Arkansas, Apr, 6, 1868; Florida,
June 9, 1868; North Carolina, July 4, 1868; Louisiana, July 9, 1868; South
Carolina, July 9, 1868; Alabama, July 13, 1868; Georgia, July 21, 1868.
Subsequent to the proclamation the following States ratified this amendment:
Virginia, Oct. 8, 1869; Mississippi, Jan. 17, 1870; Texas, Feb. 18, 1870;
Delaware, Feb. 12, 1901; Maryland, Apr. 4, 1959; California, May 6, 1959; and
Kentucky, Mar. 18, 1976.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV (West, WESTLAW Historical Notes (2005)).26 7 See Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173 (1866).
268 See id. at 177.
269 id.
27°1d. § 14.
271 Id
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act indicated Congressional intent to close the loophole left by the Thirteenth
Amendment without disturbing entirely a state's right to define and punish
criminal behavior. Members of Congress recognized that the duration of this
protection lasted only until such time as the rebellious state was readmitted
into the Union, as the act provided military administration of areas
previously in rebellion. The more permanent solution was the Fourteenth
Amendment, which had not yet been ratified.
With the redrafting of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 and the
Reconstruction Act of 1867, which would mandate passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a condition of readmission to the Union,
Congress solidified federal authority over the race-based deprivations of
liberty. When the original "bill to secure the writ of Habeas Corpus to
persons held in slavery or involuntary servitude contrary to the Constitution
of the United States" actually became law on February 5, 1867, its language
had been altered substantially. The new language closed the loophole
concerning a state's ability to shield race-based deprivations of liberty from
federal review.
In contrast, the new act, as passed, extended federal habeas jurisdiction
to "all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty, in
violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States
.... ,272 This was a highly significant change in the habeas corpus power273
but one that logically followed the Habeas Corpus Acts of 1863 and 1866,
the CRA of 1866, and the Freedmen's Bureau Acts of 1865 and 1866.
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 would give the desired effect to the
Privileges or Immunities clause. The scope of this language, on its face, is
very broad.274 There is no question that the Congress that adopted the 1867
act was concerned about the liberty of recently emancipated slaves. Congress
272 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
273 The same act also provided for expanded federal power to review state-court
violations of privileges or immunities
where any title, right, privilege or immunity is claimed under the constitution, or
any treaty or statute of or commission held, or authority exercised under the
United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or immunity
specially set up or claimed by either party under such constitution, treaty, statute,
commission, or authority, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the
Supreme Court of the United States, upon a writ of error ....
Id. §2.
274 Some have argued that the Congress did not intend to allow all state-court
convictions to be challenged under the 1867 Act, limiting the application of this provision to
persons detained under the various state apprenticeships. See Mayers, supra note 148, at 43-
44. Relying in part upon his belief that Congress did not want to alter the federalism balance,
Professor Mayers argues that Congress intended to reach only state apprenticeships and
vagrancy. Id
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intended habeas corpus to extend to the private apprenticeships, which were
taking the place of slavery. However, Congress also sought to reach
vagrancy, which the Black Codes punished as a criminal offense, with
penalties including corporal punishment and forced servitude on
plantations. 75 Only by extending habeas corpus to permit review of state
criminal convictions could Congress ameliorate the egregious harm
perpetuated under state Black Codes.
Proponents of the 1867 act clearly indicated that the Habeas Corpus Act
was intended to reach freed slaves who were being unjustly deprived of their
liberty pursuant to state laws. In introducing the measure in the House,
Representative Lawrence described its purpose:
On the 19th of December last, my colleague [Mr. Shellabarger] introduced
a resolution instructing the Judiciary Committee to inquire and report to
the House as soon as practicable, by bill or otherwise, what legislation is
necessary to enable the courts of the United States to enforce the freedom
of the wife and children of soldiers of the United States, and also to
enforce the liberty of all persons. Judge Ballard, of the district court of
Kentucky, decided that there was no act of Congress giving courts of the
United States jurisdiction to enforce the rights and liberties of such
persons. In pursuance of that resolution of my colleague this bill has been
introduced, the effect of which is to enlarge the privilege of the writ of
hobeas [sic] corpus, and make the jurisdiction of the courts and judges of
the United States coextensive with all the powers that can be conferred
upon them. It is a bill of the largest liberty, and does not interfere with
persons in military custody or restrain the writ of habeas corpus at all.
276
It is also clear that the act was intended to reach state-court convictions. As
Lynum Trumbull asserted:
The habeas corpus act of 1789, to which this bill is an amendment,
confines the jurisdiction of the United States courts in issuing writs of
habeas corpus to persons who are held under United States laws. Now, a
person might be held under a State law in violation of the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and he ought to have in such a case the benefit
of the writ, and we agree that he ought to have recourse to the United
States courts to show that he was illegally imprisoned in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States.
277
The following year, during the debate about rescinding Supreme Court
review of habeas actions, Trumbull made clear the relationship between the
275 See supra notes 169-96 and accompanying text.
276 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 4151 (1866).
277 See Mayers, supra note 148, at 38-39.
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Habeas Act of 1867 and the criminal convictions being obtained under the
Black Codes:
The act of 1789 authorized the issuing of all such [habeas corpus] writs in
cases where persons were deprived of their liberty underauthority or color
of authority of the United States. Why, then, was the act of 1867 passed? It
was passed to authorize writs of habeas corpus to issue in cases where
persons were deprived of their liberty under State laws or pretended State
laws. It was the object of the act of 1867 to confer jurisdiction on the
United States courts in cases not before provided for, and it was to meet a
class of cases which was arising in the rebel States, where, under pretense
of certain State laws, men made free by the Constitution of the United
States were virtually being enslaved, and it was also applicable to cases in
the State of Maryland where, under an apprentice law, freedmen were
being subjected to a species of bondage. The object was to authorize a
278habeas corpus in those cases to issue from United States courts ....
Lewis Mayers, cautioning that these partisan statements should be taken
in proper context, nevertheless stated the following:
It may be significant, however, that Representative Hubbard of
Connecticut, who strongly denounced the proposed repealer, agreed with
the statement made by Wilson, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and
sponsor of the repealer, that the purpose of the measure was to protect the
freedman from the apprentice and like laws of the former slave states.
279
The same Congress which passed the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act passed
the Reconstruction Act. The Reconstruction Act was introduced the day
before the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 became law. 280 This act mandated
that all rebellious states seeking readmission of its members to Congress first
had to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment:
when said State, by a vote of its legislature elected under said constitution,
shall have adopted the amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
proposed by the Thirty-Ninth Congress, and known as article fourteen,
and when said article shall have become a part of the Constitution of the
United States, said State shall be declared entitled to representation in
278 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2096 (1868). Numerous statements made during
the 1868 debate concerning repeal of the Supreme Court's appellate habeas jurisdiction
strongly suggest that the Habeas Corpus Act was designed to protect freed slaves.279 Mayers, supra note 148, at 42 n.46 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2168
(1868)).
281 Id. at 51.
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Congress, and senators and representatives shall be admitted therefrom on
their taking the oath prescribed by law.,...281
This series of actions demonstrate that Congress was engaged in a full-scale
and continuous effort to secure the liberty of the newly freed black citizens.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the 1867 act extended
federal habeas jurisdiction to state criminal convictions.2 82 Prior to the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,
only state criminal convictions allegedly obtained in'violation of the CRA
were removable and reviewable under the Habeas Corpus Acts of 1863 and
1866.283 With the 1867 act, Congress extended habeas jurisdiction to freed
slaves held as apprentices and convicted vagrants, whose only real crime was
being black. Moreover, the idea that the Radical Republicans were so
concerned about states' rights that they would not intend to permit federal
review of state-court convictions strains credulity. Many of them had been
engaged in conflict over this subject for decades; their opponents fought
every battle under the raised banner of federalism. The most costly war in
U.S. history had been fought over the hopelessly intertwined issues of
slavery and federalism. To think that the Radicals, on the brink of realizing
their long-sought goal, would suddenly concede final authority over this
issue to the states, is to hold a belief in the absence of logic.
4. The Slaughter-House Cases
The Supreme Court, in the Slaughter-House Cases,2 84 has validated the
general princlioles identified in this article. Although it is widely asserted that
the Supreme Court rendered the Privileges or Immunities Clause a nullity in
that case, 285 a careful reading of Slaughter-House shows otherwise. While
there is good reason to argue that the majority opinion in Slaughter-House
both misconstrued the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and
unnecessarily narrowed the scope of the protections intended under that
amendment, it must be remembered that Justice Miller's majority decision,
in listing the privileges or immunities of federal citizenship, included "the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, [as one of the] rights of the citizen
18 Act of March 2, 1967i ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428,429 (enacted over the president's veto).
282 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Towsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963);
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
283 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1991)).
284 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
285 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, TheAnti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141,
1156 n.60 (2002).
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guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.,
286
The Court went on to discuss the history of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause and held the following:
In the light of the history of these amendments, and the pervading purpose
of them, which we have already discussed, it is not difficult to give a
meaning to this clause. The existence of laws in the States where the newly
emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and
hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this
clause, and by it such laws are forbidden.
287
As controversial as this decision was and as strongly as the justices disagreed
about both the analysis and outcome of the case, they did agree on the core
principles enumerated above.288 All parties agreed that the primary purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause was to
provide protection for the recently freed slaves, and all sides agreed that
habeas corpus was one of the protected privileges that states were forbidden
from abridging.
5. The Parameters of the Right to a Federal Forum
The language that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment chose to
use was direct and prohibitive in their restrictions placed upon the states.
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States., 28 9 It is necessary to explore the
meaning of these provisions with regard to the identified underlying purpose
of providing a federal forum for habeas corpus review of race-based
incarcerations. At a minimum, this provision prohibits states from acting in a
manner that directly prevents someone from exercising his or her privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus for race-based claims. A state law, therefore, that
denied prison inmates access to the federal courts to file a petition for writ of
habeas corpus clearly offends this provision. The proscription on state action
forbids states from not only making laws which would deny habeas
jurisdiction, it also forbids states from enforcing any law which would
abridge the privilege. Clearly, some greater prohibition is therefore
restricting state action. Yet, it must be asked what limits maybe placed upon
this privilege by virtue of the definition of the privilege as one of U.S.
286 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
287 Id. at 8 1.
288 See supra note 217 for the dissenting justices' discussion of purposes and scope of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.289 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
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citizenship. These two topics are closely related and the discussion of one
necessarily involves the other.290
a. The Abridgement Prohibition
As established above, the Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended
to remove from state purview the authority to determine the lawfulness of
race-based deprivations of liberty. The privilege of habeas corpus was
designed to be the mechanism through which federal authority was asserted
over alleged race-based deprivations of liberty perpetrated by untrustworthy
290 While it was previously held in Ex parte Bollman that congressional action was
necessary to grant habeas jurisdiction under Article Ii, see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 75 (1807), the language of the Fourteenth Amendment places an implicit limitation
upon any attempt by Congress to deny a federal forum for a petitioner's race-based habeas
corpus claim. Before examining the Bollman decision and discussing why that case does not
permit Congress to abridge the writ of habeas corpus in these circumstances, note that the
Supreme Court has previously held, and recently reaffirmed, that the Fourteenth Amendment
limits congressional authority.
In Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507 (1999), the Supreme Court stated that "we have
consistently held that Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment." The Saenz Court reaffirmed the principle that "Congress' power under § 5,
however, 'is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5
grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees. "' 526 U.S. at 508
(quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n. 10 (1966)). Finally, the Saenz Court
explicitly held that "Congress has no affirmative power to authorize the States to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment and is implicitly prohibited from passing legislation that purports to
validate any such violation." Id. at 508. Saenz could not be clearer: Congress has no more
authority to abridge this privilege of U.S. citizenship than do the states.
Bollman, however, is often cited for the proposition that Congress could simply refuse
to authorize federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 40, at 9-11.
This is surely a debatable proposition in itself, for the Suspension Clause would be of little
substance if Congress was permitted to deny all federal habeas jurisdiction in times other
than during insurrection or rebellion. A careful reading of Bollman does not support this
suspect assertion. Rather, that decision speaks of the Suspension Clause acting as an
injunction, placing a positive legal obligation upon Congress to provide recourse for
exercising the privilege. This understanding of the writ as constitutionally compelled was
echoed by the Court in Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963), when the Court
held that "[t]he habeas corpus jurisdictional statute implements the constitutional command
that the writ of habeas corpus be made available." Since the writ of habeas corpus has
common law antecedents, the more likely intent of the Framers in drafting the Suspension
Clause is the common sense understanding of that clause, i.e. the writ is available unless
Congress explicitly suspends it, something which is possible only in times of insurrection or
rebellion. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 40, at 12-19; see also James S. Liebman,
Apocalypse Next Time?. The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus / Direct Review
Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997 (1992); Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus
Relititgation, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 579 (1982). The history Freedman cites makes it
difficult for any party to maintain that the Suspension Clause did not anticipate a privilege
that was independent of congressional approval.
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states. In so providing, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment mandated
that the states could not "make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.",291 This language
stands in contrast to the original Privileges and Immunities Clause found in
Article IV of the Constitution in which the term "abridge" is absent.292
Article IV, § 2, cl. 1 speaks in terms of entitlement to some body of
privileges and immunities: "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." 293 The
alteration adopted by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment is important
because it was designed to reinforce the notion that the privilege of habeas
corpus referenced in that amendment described the federal writ as it was
then defined. Forbidding abridgment of a privilege presupposes definitive
boundaries in a way that merely entitling someone to the privilege does not.
In choosing the term "abridge" instead of "deny" as used in the
successive clause, the Framers undeniably meant to proscribe more carefully
a state's power to affect enjoyment of these privileges and immunities. The
term "abridge" was used in the nineteenth century much as it is today.294
During the nineteenth century, "abridge" was defined in the following terms:
"1. To make shorter in words, still keeping the substance; to epitomize; 2. To
curtail; to reduce; to contract; to diminish; 3. To deprive of; to cut off
from. 295 Legal dictionaries in use at the time confirm this meaning of the
term. For instance, one defined "abridge" as "[t]o shorten a declaration or
count by taking away or severing some of the substance of it."'296 Through
use of the term "abridge," the Framers were referencing an existing privilege
with boundaries that could not be diminished.
At the time of the ratification of this amendment, the federal privilege of
habeas corpus included a federal forum.297 The same Congress that wrote the
291 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
292 Id. § 2.
293 Id.
294 Today "abridge" is defined as: "to diminish," "shorten," or "reduce in scope."
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 46 (9th ed. 1988).
295 JOSEPH EMERSON WORCESTER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 6 (Boston,
Brewer & Tileston 1875).
296 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY: ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 45
(Philadelphia, G.W. Childs, 12th ed. 1868).
2971 do not assert that Congress would have no ability to affect the structure of federal
habeas jurisdiction in any manner. Congress has in the past altered the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction in habeas cases. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1859 (1868). But see
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (requiring unambiguous expression of congressional
intent to strip the Court of habeas jurisdiction). Congressional power in this area, however, is
limited by the interaction of the Suspension Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause;
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Reconstruction Act of 1867, mandating approval of the Fourteenth
Amendment for states seeking readmission of their delegates to the
Congress, had approximately thirty days earlier extended federal habeas
review to include for the first time "all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty
or law of the United States."'298 It is this privilege of habeas corpus that they
constitutionally mandated to be available to the newly freed "citizens of the
United States., 299 This extension of the writ to individuals in state custody
brought with it the Suspension Clause's protection, as this privilege of U.S.
citizenship was defined not only by the 1867 act extending its jurisdiction to
anyone restrained of their liberty in violation of the Constitution but also by
a constitutional protection against suspension by Congress.
In adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, members of Congress
repeatedly referenced the privileges or immunities of federal citizenship in
terms of fundamental rights, which were beyond the power of any
government to rescind.3"0 While these references clearly intended to evoke
natural law rights, they also included habeas corpus. The inclusion of habeas
corpus as one of the privileges or immunities was necessary because this
clause sought to protect "the natural rights of all men or such auxiliary rights
as were necessary to secure and maintain those natural rights., 301 The
commingling of natural law rights and habeas corpus as privileges or
immunities of federal citizenship highlights the exalted position of the writ
and its inviolability in the eyes of Congress when framing the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Whatever power Congress once had to abridge the scope of habeas
corpus, that power was constitutionally restrained by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Saenz v. Roe makes clear that congressional power is limited
it cannot be exercised to eliminate a federal forum for claims asserting race-based
deprivations of liberty by an individual state.
2" Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 385, 385.
299 As has previously been noted, no serious scholar or court has ever disputed the fact
that the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically designed to reference
the freed slaves and overturn the Dred Scott decision. See supra Part.II.C.2.
300 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115-19, 2542-43,2765 (1866). The
same natural law language was used by members of Congress to explain the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1866).
301 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 37 (1981) (quoting JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 236 (1965)).
Antieau quotes tenBroek further:
The privileges or immunities clause was regarded as reenacting the comity clause
of Article Four into which United States citizenship and natural rights had been
read .... The language of the clause ... cannot be abstracted from the natural
rights and national citizenship doctrines which constituted the foundation upon
which it was based and which prompted its use.
[VOL. 93
TIME OUT OF MIND
by the Privileges or hmmunities Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment not
only proscribes the states from abridging the writ of habeas corpus for race-
based deprivations of liberty, but it equally limits Congress from authorizing
states to abridge this privilege.
30 2
III. NEO-FEDERALISM: AN OLD WOLF IN NEW SHEEP'S CLOTHrNG
The strong desire for localized government did not end with the adoption
of the Civil War Amendments. Nor were those amendments designed to shift
the locus of authority over most governmental functions from the states to
the national government. These amendments were not meaningless,
however, and the shift that they were designed to influence raised fears
among states-rights advocates, who continued to resist any encroachment on
rights originally and traditionally vested in the states. This resistance was
particularly widespread and vociferous concerning issues of the states' police
powers. Following the death of Reconstruction and the apparent evisceration
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause under the Slaughter-House ruling,
the antebellum federalism balance largely returned to issues of police
powers.
The motivations of those resisting change were not merely theoretical
arguments concerning the proper repository of authority over police powers
in a federated republic; nor were they entirely driven by economic concerns.
Vitriolic racism infused the social and legal regimes used to oppress and
exploit the labor of African-Americans in this country. Whether in the
context of torturous interrogations 30 3 or circus trials, 304 states repeatedly
proved themselves unwilling or unable to protect the rights of racial
minorities.
The resistance to federal habeas review of state-court criminal
convictions has continued until the present day. Judicial and legislative
proponents of states' rights have unconstitutionally, though effectively,
returned final authority over race-based deprivations of liberty to the states.
X2 As previously noted, there are strong arguments that protection afforded by the
Privileges or Immunities clause was intended to be more expansive. However, the core of the
Fourteenth Amendment, generally, and the Privileges or Immunities clause, specifically, was
for the protection of the newly freed slaves. As noted by many scholars, the actual language
when drafted was deliberately written more broadly to encompass other racial minorities as
well. See, e.g., Angela M. Ford, Private Alienage Discrimination and the Reconstruction
Amendments: The Constitutionality of 42 US.C. § 1981, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 457,463 n.48
(2001); see also CONG. GLOBE, 41 st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1869); CONG. GLOBE, 41 st Cong., 2d
Sess. 3658 (1870) (remarks of Sen. Stewart).
303 See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
304 See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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This has been done through legislation mandating federal deference to state-
court legal determinations 3°5 and state-court findings of fact,30 6 and also
prohibiting a federal hearing due to the failure of state-court lawyers to
sufficiently develop the factual claim.30 7 It has also been accomplished
through a complex set of judicial doctrines which have created barriers to
federal habeas corpus review,30 8 including exhaustion, abuse of the writ,
procedural default, and the adequate and independent state-court grounds
for denying relief (or the "adequacy doctrine").30 9 Both legislation and the
adequacy doctrine, which require deference to state-court factual or legal
determinations, are unconstitutional insofar as they purport to allow state
courts to make final determinations concerning race-based denials of liberty.
A. Valid Contexts for Assertion of States'Rights
The Civil War Amendments were not intended to create a wholesale
shift of power from the states to the federal government. By and large, the
powers previously exercised or retained by the states were intended to
remain within each state's purview.310 State authority to tax its citizens, to
regulate health and safety, and to criminalize conduct were all largely left
untouched. These amendments, instead, were intended to shift the federalism
balance over a relatively narrow band. Within the core of this shifted band
was the location of final authority over the lawfulness of a state's deprivation
of liberty alleged to be based upon considerations of race. After the Civil
War Amendments, authority over such claims rested with the federal
government.
In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War and the adoption of the
Civil War Amendments, the status of freed slaves and the roles they would
play in American society remained a critical, and controversial, issue. As this
issue was entangled with broader federalism concerns, many states-rights
advocates continued to resent federal intrusion into matters they deemed to
be local issues. 311 Due to a variety of forces, however, 312 the issue of federal
305 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2005).
306 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2005).
307 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2005).
308 These doctrines have often been subsequently codified, creating an even more
complex interaction between federal case law and statutes, both state and federal.
309 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 735,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
310 Leaving aside the question previously discussed of whether the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to incorporate the first eight Amendments against the states, it is
clear that most state authority was left untouched by the Civil War Amendments.
311 See FONER, supra note 108, at 346-92.
312 Id. at 524-64. Foner points out that a combination of factors, including economic
depression, racism, political resistance, and obstructionism frustrated the purposes of
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protection of African-Americans faded from public consciousness. Issues of
federalism did not so easily fade and continued to be a source of friction in
the nation.
The argument over the proper distribution of power between the federal
government and the states played out in various contexts over the century
following Reconstruction, including continuation of conflicts dating from the
time of Chief Justice Marshall in M'Culloch v. Maryland 13 and City ofNew
York v. Miln.314 These cases highlighted the tension between the extension of
federal power over the states under the Supremacy Clause and the express
reservation of power under the Tenth Amendment. This latter provision of
the Constitution, and a state's traditional authority over the health and
welfare of its citizens, created the strong and understandable resistance to
any asserted federal authority to review the exercise of state police powers.
Litigants continued to use habeas corpus as an instrument to define the
borders of governmental authority over deprivations of liberty in the
twentieth century. Beginning with Brown v. Allen, the Supreme Court
increasingly recognized federal court authority to review state convictions." 5
These decisions were based upon a strong foundation, resting initially with
316the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. A number of interrelated factors
influenced this assertion of federal power. Counsel in state-court
proceedings was increasingly made available both at trial and on direct
appeal. 317 Moreover, the creation of legal service organizations, law-school
clinical programs, and the civil rights movement all increased the availability
of counsel willing to litigate issues on behalf of indigent clients. 318 These
factors expanded the number of federal habeas corpus cases being litigated
before the federal courts of appeal and the Supreme Court. In turn, this
Reconstruction.
313 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
314 City ofNew York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837). Although Miln was argued
before Chief Justice Marshall's death, it was decided after he died. See Mary Sarah Bilder,
The Struggle Over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, andArticles of Commerce, 61
Mo. L. REv. 743, 800 (1996).
315 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
316 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385, 385.
317 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The provision of counsel in early
stages of proceedings itself increased the likelihood of success in habeas proceedings. More
issues were likely to be preserved, defendants were more likely to be made aware of their
options under the writ, and they were more likely to receive some guidance in filing the writ,
even if they were not actually represented by counsel.
318 However, the expansion in litigation does not mean that adequate counsel is being
provided to all criminal defendants in need. See generally Richard Klein, The Emperor
Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to the Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986).
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resulted in more federal decisions outlining procedural and substantive rights
available to state-court prisoners seeking to challenge the lawfulness of their
incarcerations.
Also increasing at this time was the number of habeas cases involving
prisoners sentenced to death. Those challenges frequently raised the issue of
racial disparity in applying the ultimate punishment.319 Initially, the Court's
jurisprudence and related congressional action on these issues resulted in an
increased, availability of the federal habeas remedy to state convicts.320
With a change in membership among the federal judiciary and an
increasing hostilityto federal review of state-incarceration decisions, federal
courts began to retreat from more expansive federal habeas corpus
provisions. Federal courts adopted various doctrines as ways to limit a
federal habeas litigant's ability to obtain a hearing in federal court and,
having once obtained that hearing, to win on the merits. These doctrines
include the following, several of which are interrelated: procedural default,
exhaustion of state-court remedies, deference to state-court findings of fact,
increased deference to state-court determinations of law, abuse of the writ,
and adequate and independent state-court grounds for denying relief. Each
of these doctrines can be complex in its own right, but together they create a
litigation maze which causes great difficulty for any litigant attempting to
weave her way through to daylight. Supreme Court justices have repeatedly
recognized the complexity of litigating in this area and the near impossibility
for a pro se litigant to navigate this maze successfully. 32' These judicially
crafted doctrines were eventually codified under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Periaity Act of 1996. 322
319 See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (claim of racial discrimination injury
selection during rape trial resulting in death sentence); see also Davis v. Davis, 361 F.2d 770
(5th Cir. 1966); Mitchell v. Henslee, 332 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1964). For discussions of the
effect of race on cases during this same period, see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977),
and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
320 This increase was in the form of both substantive review and the procedural
protections afforded to the federal habeas petitioner. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963), for an example of how the Court's expansion ofprocedural protections was followed
by congressional action that wrote these protections into substantive statutory law. See Brian
M. Hofstadt, How Congress Might Redesign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ of Habeas Corpus, 49
DuKE LJ. 957, 962 n.55 (2000). A.
321 See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 114 S.Ct. 1127, 1130 (1994) (cert. denied) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (announcing that due to fairness being undermined by procedure, he "no
longer shall tinker with the machinery of death"); see also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
714-15 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (seeing an irreconcilable conflict between the
requirement of guided discretion in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and the
command in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), to consider any factor favoring a
noncapital sentence, Justice Scalia announces that he will no longer apply Lockett).
322 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 735,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
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Some of these procedural mechanisms were appropriately adopted by the
Court. For instance, the requirement of exhaustion stresses the need for
comity in the federal system and respects a coordinate branch of government.
Abuse of the writ, while troubling in some of its manifestations,323 has
considerable merit concerning the efficient use ofjudicial resources. 24 But
the most troubling development of doctrines designed to limit federal habeas
jurisdiction over state deprivations of liberty comes in the context of the
"adequate and independent" state-court grounds for denying relief. Under
this theory, states can procedurally default a litigant based upon a substantive
or procedural rule requiring the issue to be raised at a particular stage in the
state-court proceeding.325 If the litigant fails to raise the issue at the
appropriate time in state court, he is forever barred from raising the issue in
federal court. For an indigent defendant, this doctrine effectively places the
availability of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction in the hands of counsel
appointed by the state.32 6 In the context of race-based deprivations of liberty,
this doctrine is unconstitutional because it offends the Privileges or
Immunities Clause's guarantee of a federal forum to hear the validity of such
claims.
B. "Adequate and Independent" State Grounds for Denying Federal
Habeas Review
The use of "adequate and independent" state grounds for denying federal
jurisdiction over federal claims has a history related, but not identical, to that
of habeas corpus under the U.S. Constitution. While habeas corpus was
inextricably tied to notions of federalism in our system, the doctrine of
adequate and independent state grounds is an even more direct expression of
these principles. There are important differences to keep in mind when
323 Abuse of the writ, designed to prevent repeated filings of federal habeas corpus
petitions, is particularly troubling as applied in some of the federal court rulings concerning
the intricate relationships between newly discovered evidence, ineffective assistance of
counsel, and the cause-and-prejudice standard.
324 Since the courts have held that, in certain contexts, a habeas litigant has no
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, the cause-and-prejudice standard
cannot be met to excuse the abuse of the writ. See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1
(1992).
325 See Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 93 (1955); see also 2 JAMES S. LIEBMAN &
RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 26 (3d ed. 1998).
326 Giving states authority over race-based claims whenever local counsel, appointed by
state authorities, fails to challenge the racial bias of the state criminal justice system creates a
perverse incentive to appoint lawyers who will not challenge racial bias. It is absurd to argue
that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections were so inadequately structured that state
actors could so easily defeat them.
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discussing some of the historical intersections of common law habeas
corpus, federal habeas review of race claims, and a rule of construction
sometimes used to limit the availability of federal habeas.
These critical differences are evident in the fundamental character of
each. Habeas corpus, the Great Writ of Liberty, is a constitutionally
mandated privilege with venerable ancient roots. The adequate and
independent state grounds doctrine, while implicating basic principles of
constitutional interpretation, is a judicial construct with disputed con-
stitutional and statutory foundations. Unlike habeas corpus, the adequate and
independent doctrine is not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, nor is
its suspension con-stitutionally prohibited.327 This doctrine is also not tied to
any particular procedure; rather, it is a judicial mechanism to control the
dockets of the federal courts, while giving life to a particular federalism
balance.
1. Development of the Doctrine
The doctrine of adequate and independent state grounds has mutated
substantially since its earliest uses in direct appeal cases coming to the U.S.
Supreme Court from the supreme courts of the various states. In its original
form, the doctrine did not serve as a limitation on the power of federal courts
to decide issues of federal law when faced with otherwise adequate and
independent state grounds. Rather, in Murdock v. City of Memphis,328 the
Supreme Court first reviewed questions of federal law before turning to the
question of whether the state-court rulings, based on state law, provided
adequate and independent grounds for the decision. The 1874 Murdock
decision is an affirmation of federal power to decide federal issues even
when presented in concert with arguably adequate and independent state
grounds. Murdockpermitted federal courts to affirm a state-courtjudgment
on state-law grounds but did not bar review of either federal or state-law
claims. Not until Eustis v. Bolles,329 decided two decades after Murdock,
would the Court use the adequacy doctrine to bar a review of federal issues.
This shift was accompanied neither by fanfare in its pronouncement nor,
arguably, by a constitutional or statutory basis.
The metamorphosis of this doctrine to one which limits federal court
jurisdiction over federal claims has certainly sparked a great deal of
controversy and debate. At this point, a brief exploration of the asserted
327 At best, it may be inferred from the structure of government created by the
Constitution and through an interpretation of Article III and the Tenth Amendment. This
argument will be discussed in further detail, infra Part.llI.B.
328 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
329 Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361 (1893).
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bases for the adequacy doctrine is required before continuing with a
discussion concerning how these bases, even if valid in some contexts, do
not justify application of this doctrine to deny federal court review of race-
based deprivations of liberty.
330
2. Theoretical Bases for Adequacy Doctrine
Courts and scholars have located the source of the adequacy doctrine in
a variety of places. Constitutional, statutory, and common-law bases for this
doctrine have been asserted. Regardless ofwhere one locates the justification
for the adequacy doctrine, these bases cannot justify its current application to
claims of race-based deprivations of liberty.
The arguments that a constitutional basis exists for the adequacy
doctrine rest upon implication. That is, there is no explicit constitutional
command requiring the federal courts to forego review of federal claims in
the face of adequate and independent state-court grounds for a decision.
These constitutional arguments instead rest upon three general bases. First,
there are arguments based upon the cases and controversies requirement of
Article III and the related prohibition against issuing advisory opinions.
Second, arguments supporting the adequacy doctrine center on the tension
between the Supremacy Clause and the Tenth Amendment. Finally, some
rely on the general structure of federalism embodied in the Constitution.
Article III, § 2 extends the federal judicial power to all cases and
controversies arising under the Constitution, treaties, and other laws of the
United States.331 This jurisdictional requirement has been interpreted to
mean that federal courts are forbidden from announcing advisory
opinions.332 Federal courts, therefore, are deemed to be unable to declare the
merits of any issue that is not an active dispute before that court.
33 3
Proponents of Article III as a basis for the adequacy doctrine argue that
330 Other scholars have fully examined the historic justifications for the adequacy
doctrine. See, e.g., Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: OldRoads,
New Paths A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (1986); Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S.
Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the
Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 1291 (1986).
331 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Brian A. Stem, An Argument Against Imposing the
Federal "Case or Controversy " Requirement on State Courts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 77 (1994),
for discussion of the "cases and controversies" requirement of Article II1.
332 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967), for discussion of the advisory
opinion ban.
333 See Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness,
105 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1992), for an illuminating discussion of mootness. Courts
developed doctrines of mootness and ripeness to explain certain subsets of cases in which the
parties do not present a true case or controversy to the court.
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federal courts lack a true case or controversy whenever a state court
determines state substantive law or procedural rules in a manner that
adequately decides a case independent from any federal issue raised in that
case.
The second purported constitutional basis for the adequacy doctrine rests
upon the Tenth Amendment. In particular, the adequacy doctrine relates to
state judicial authority over that broad range of undefined power that is
neither delegated to the'United States nor constitutionally proscribed to the
states.33" The Tenth Amendment may be viewed as either a truism, designed
to reiterate that which was already stated elsewhere in the Constitution, or it
may be viewed as a counter-Supremacy Clause.335 Under either view, it is
this tension between the Supremacy Clause and the Tenth Amendment that
gives rise to the second purported constitutional basis for the adequacy
doctrine.
According to this view, state law that does not conflict with the
Constitution (by entering upon one of the specific enumerated areas of
federal power) must be given its full effect and not made subservient to
unrelated federal law. From the time of Chief Justice Marshall's death and
the decision in City of New York v. Miln3 36 until relatively recently, this view
of state-federal relations remained dominant. In particular, Miln identified
the state police powers as being the area where state authority was
334 U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."
335 The Supremacy Clause is found at U.S. CONsT. art. VI, el. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
336 City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837):
A state has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and
things, within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation; where that jurisdiction is
not surrendered or restrained by the constitution of the United States. That,. by
virtue of this, it is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a state,
to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its
general welfare, by any and every act of legislation, which it may deem to be
conducive to these ends; where the power over the' particular subject, or the
manner of its exercise is not surrendered or restrained, in the manner just stated.
That all those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may,
perhaps, more properly be called internal police, are not thus surrendered or
restrained; and that, consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a state is
complete, unqualified and exclusive.
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"complete, unqualified and exclusive. 337 This understanding of the police
power as properly residing with the states is well-founded and touches
deeply held principles of self-governance. It is unsurprising, therefore, that
states would cling most tenaciously to the adequacy doctrine where federal
review of state criminal convictions is concerned. It is in this area that states
most strongly assert that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review state
convictions whenever a state court determines state substantive law or
procedural rules in a manner that adequately decides a case independent
from any federal issue.
The final purported constitutional basis for the adequacy doctrine greatly
resembles that of the Tenth Amendment, but instead of relying solely upon
that provision, rests upon the structure of the Constitution. The division of
power between federal and state authorities, enumerating specific powers to
be exercised by the federal government 338 without a corresponding
enumeration of powers granted to the states, supports the conclusion that the
large body of unenumerated powers is properly vested in the states. Disputes
arising under these subject areas are properly left to the states to decide, and
federal power should not be used to override proper state-court decisions.
Within the confines of these structural justifications arise doctrines of comity
(respect for the decisions of co-equal courts) and finality (states should have
a predictable understanding of when litigation on a particular matter will
end).
One thing that all of these purported justifications have in common is
that none of them can overcome the explicit constitutional command that
"[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of federal citizenship," 339 including the privilege of habeas
corpus. Even if these arguments are accepted as accurate,34 ° the adequacy
doctrine fails to pass constitutional muster when applied to race-based
deprivations of liberty. A brief examination of each basis proves this point.
The ban on advisory opinions, premised on the cases and controversies
provisions of Article III, will not suffice to ban federal habeas review of
race-based deprivations of liberty in the face of the Fourteenth
Amendment's mandate that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge this privilege" of habeas corpus.341 Even when the advisory
opinion ban is deemed to have constitutional origins, to trigger the ban state
337 id.
338 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; art. II, § 2; art. III, § 2.
339 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
340 This author recognizes that serious flaws exist in each argument asserting a
constitutional basis for the adequacy doctrine. See generally, e.g., Berger, The Supreme
Court and Defense Counsel, supra note 33 1.
341 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
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law must be capable of rendering the federal question moot. Since the
Fourteenth Amendment explicitly prohibits the states from making or
enforcing any law that has this effect, the lawfulness of a petitioner's claim
that race impermissibly influenced the deprivation of liberty must be
determined by the federal courts. A federal court decision on the merits of
such a claim will never amount to an advisory opinion. Use of the adequacy
doctrine in such circumstances is itself unconstitutional, as no federal court
can decline jurisdiction granted to it by the Constitution. Nor can Congress
through legislation eviscerate the effect of a provision of the Constitution.
The Tenth Amendment rationale for the adequacy doctrine is similarly
insufficient since the powers reserved to the States are explicitly those
powers "not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States. 3 42 With the vesting of this authority in the
federal courts and the explicit prohibition against the states making or
enforcing any law that abridges this jurisdictional vesting, the Tenth
Amendment's residual rights simply do not encompass the power to decide
the lawfulness of race-based deprivations of liberty.
Finally, the Constitution's structure of federalism cannot reserve this
power to the states. While the power to decide whether race based
deprivations of liberty were lawful did reside with the states prior to the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the core purpose of that amendment
was to shift the federalism balance on this narrow issue. Therefore, applying
the adequacy doctrine to deny federal court jurisdiction over habeas claims
of race-based deprivations of liberty is both anachronistic and unconsti-
tutional.
3. Statutory Bases for the Adequacy Doctrine
No statute existing prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
nor promulgated since that time can negate the effect of a constitutional
amendment. The statutory basis for the adequacy doctrine has been located
in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Specifically, the Court in Murdock v. City of
Memphis argued that the Judiciary Act of 1789 forbade federal court review
of claims decided on state-law grounds.343 The Court went on to note that
the restrictive language found in the 1789 act had been removed by the
amendment of 1867.' 44 Despite this amendment, the Court found that
Congress did not intend to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts
beyond the traditional limit of examining state-court rulings for erroneous
342 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
343 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 630 (1874).
3
44 id.
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statements of federal law. 4
First, language once existing in the Judiciary Act of 1789 would not and
could not defeat a grant of federal jurisdiction provided through subsequent
constitutional amendment. Moreover, constructively reinserting a provision
into the Judiciary Act and construing it in opposition to the Fourteenth
Amendment flies in the face of congressional intent. For the same Congress
that passed the Fourteenth Amendment, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, and
the Reconstruction Act of 1867 also deleted this language when it passed the
Judiciary Act of 1867.346 This constellation of actions by the 39th Congress
leaves no doubt about the Framers' intent in adopting the Fourteenth
Amendment and about Congress' limitations in controlling federal
jurisdiction over race-based claims in the face of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
4. Federal Common Law Basis for the Adequacy Doctrine
The adequacy doctrine is also justified on the basis of the courts'
inherent common law power to place limitations on the size of its docket.
This is perhaps the most persuasive argument for the existence of the
adequacy doctrine. Of course, while this argument may be persuasive in
providing a rationale for the adequacy doctrine, it does nothing to establish
its legitimacy in the face of a constitutional provision granting federal
jurisdiction over specific claims to the federal courts. It is axiomatic that
federal courts cannot deny jurisdiction over claims properly vested there by
the Constitution. 34 While federal courts may possess common law authority
to manage the courts' dockets, powers exercised under that authority can
never contravene the Constitution.
C. AEDPA Provisions
A variety of provisions of the AEDPA work to transfer authority over
federal claims back to state courts. These include the provisions found in 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (d), (e):
(d)
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
345 Id.
346 See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 331, at 1316-22.
347 See Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the
Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984).
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custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with
'respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 'merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -
(1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
(e)
In a proceeding instituted by'an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court; a determination of a factual issue made by a State court
shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the
burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and
convincing evidence.
(2)
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim
in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary
hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that -
(A)
the claim relies on -
-(i)
a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to
-cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that
was previously unavailable; or
(ii)
a factual predicate that could not have been previously
discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B)
the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.348
348 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), (e) (2004).
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The deference to a state-court determination of law found in § 2254(d)
and the heightened deference to state-court determinations of fact under
§ 2254(e)(2) are unconstitutional insofar as they purport to place these
limitations on race-based claims. These provisions offend the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment both in their adoption and
in their enforcement.
As discussed more fully in Part III, the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article., 349 Nothing in that grant of authority to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment permits Congress to abrogate its provisions. In
the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court held that the purpose of clause
five was to enable Congress "to provide modes of redress against the
operation of state laws, and the action of state officers, executive or judicial,
when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the
amendment., 3 0 Deferring to state courts on issues of law where denials of
liberty are based upon race is not only a perversion of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but it is a desecration of the incalculable sacrifices made to
eliminate slavery. Likewise, creating a heightened form of deference,
unheard of in 1868, to findings of fact by those courts that were instrumental
in the unequal and racially biased application of the Black Codes offends the
principles underlying the amendment and its explicit commands.
These provisions of the AEDPA are also offensive to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause in their enforcement. The Fourteenth Amendment
explicitly commands that "No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." '35 1
States cannot enforce any law that abridges the privilege of habeas corpus,
particularly in relation to the immunity from race-based deprivations of
liberty that lies at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, in the
context of the AEDPA provisions that purport to limit access to federal
habeas review of race-based claims, even if the enactment of these
provisions is deemed constitutional, their enforcement by states cannot be.
To the extent that the AEDPA provisions are deemed to be lawfully enacted,
states cannot insist on exhaustion of race-based claims. By insisting on
exhaustion, which is not constitutionally mandated, states are enforcing a
law that abridges the privilege of habeas corpus.
149 U.S. CoNsI. amend. XIV, § 5.
350 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
351 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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1. Effects on Race-Based Claims
The use of the adequacy doctrine and the application of the AEDPA
have effectively permitted states to reassert final jurisdictional authority over
claims of race-based deprivations of liberty, contravening the intent of the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. At this point, the reader might ask
whether this contravention matters outside a purely academic realm. Have
we not progressed as a society far enough to trust that states are not
depriving people of their liberty on the basis of race? Can we not trust the
states to correct any racial bias within their own systems? An examination of
the evidence suggests that race is still playing a critical factor in many
decisions to incarcerate.352 Moreover, the environment that permits race-
based incarcerations to occur also virtually assures that many of these cases
will proceed through state courts without the issues being challenged or
353preserved for federal habeas review.
The case of McCleskey v. Kemp demonstrates this fact. In McCleskey,
the Court rejected a habeas petitioner's claim that statistical data, purporting
to show racial bias in application of the death penalty in Georgia, provided a
352 Statistical evidence shows that race is an excellent predictor ofamale's likelihood of
being incarcerated. A study conducted by Human Rights Watch in 2002 documented some
startling disparities in state-incarceration rates among various racial groups. For instance, in
twelve states, black men are incarcerated at rates between twelve and fifteen times the rate
for white men. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH PRESS, RACE AND INCARCERATION RATES IN THE
UNITED STATES (2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/race.html. The
same study showed that in ten states, Latino men are incarcerated at rates between five and
nine times greater than white men. In fifteen states, black women are incarcerated at rates
between ten and thirty-five times greater than the rates for white women. In eight states,
Latina women are incarcerated at rates between four and seven times greater than white
women. In six states, black youths under the age of eighteen are incarcerated at rates between
twelve and twenty-five times greater than white youths of the same age. In four states,
Hispanic youths under eighteen are incarcerated at rates between seven and seventeen times
the rate of white youths of the same age. See id.
353 The effects of this disproportionate incidence of incarceration are devastating on
African-American and Hispanic family structures, An African-American child is nine times
more likely to have a parent incarcerated than is a white child. See UNITED STATES
CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, RESPONSIBILITY, REHABILITATION AND RESTORATION: A
CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE ON CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2002), available at
http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/criminal.htm. A Hispanic child is three times more likely than a
white child to have a parent imprisoned. Id. Yet, each case does not necessarily evidence
deprivations of liberty that are predicated upon race. While statistical data can provide
important clues about decision trends, it often provides little help in determining whether a
particular decision to incarcerate a particular individual was impermissibly influenced by
race. As the Supreme Court made clear in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987),
statistical data alone is an insufficient basis upon which to conclude that racial animus
influenced any individual decision.
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sufficient basis to overturn McCleskey's sentence.354 Instead, the Court held
that the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause required petitioner
to prove that the individual decisionmakers in his case acted with racial
animus. 355 At a minimum, claims asserting that particular decisionmakers in
an individual case were racially biased are placed by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause beyond the purview of states courts. However, the history
of the Fourteenth Amendment and related provisions that have been detailed
in this article make clear the Framers' intent to reach claims such as that
raised by McCleskey. The Framers were motivated by a desire to ensure that
the newly emancipated black citizens were not subjected to punishments
they would not receive if they were white. This history calls into question the
validity of the Supreme Court's decision in that case. The Court rejected
McCleskey's claim because, in part, it "challenges decisions at the heart of
the State's criminal justice system., 356 If the heart of a state's criminal justice
system is racially biased, that is precisely what the Privileges or Immunities
Clause permits an incarcerated citizen to challenge.
Regardless of whether McCleskey itself is re-examined in light of the
history which motivated the Fourteenth Amendment, many challenges
related to racial bias in individual cases are not being examined by the
federal courts. Racial animus on the part of police, prosecutors, and judges
in individual cases, resulting in improper convictions or increased
punishment, provide the kind of claims that MeCleskey challenged lawyers
to bring. These claims and others, including those arising under Batson v.
Kentucky,357 must have a federal habeas forum if they are to be given a full
and fair hearing. State courts should not be trusted to handle these matters
fairly and cannot be given the authority to do so consistent with the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
There is a failure to examine these claims in federal court because the
current procedural system requires local state-court practitioners to
challenge the system of which they are a product and upon which they are
dependent for their professional and economic welfare. This statement is not
meant to impugn the integrity of these practitioners. Rather, it is a realistic
assessment of the difficulty in expecting local counsel to challenge
"decisions at the heart of the State's criminal justice system."35 It is always
5McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 292.
3 55
1 d. at 297.
3 56 id.
357 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the practice of challenging
potential jurors solely because of their race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment). Batson and McCleskey claims are mentioned as examples of types
of claims cognizable in habeas proceedings but should not be construed as an exhaustive list.
"I McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
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difficult to see one's own prejudices, and those with whom one is close.
Many race-based claims are not raised, most likely because local counsel do
not perceive the problem. In addition, when they do see the problem,
economic, social, and political constraints often prevent lawyers from raising
these claims in the courtroom in which counsel regularly appears. More
importantly, it is a fact that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to locate the authority over these decisions at the federal level
through the writ of habeas corpus. Permitting the federal jurisdiction over
such claims to turn on the vagaries and parochial practices of county lawyers
and judges undermines the entire redistributive purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Race still matters. Historically, in this nation, race was the best predictor
of whether someone was held in slavery. Compromises made at the start of
this great republic wedded the issue of racial slavery to the defining structure
of federalism in our Constitution. Entwined together into an unholy rope,
slavery and federalism bound our nation to destruction as surely as our
slaves were bound to misery. Habeas corpus, the Great Writ of Liberty, was
used by slave traders, slave owners, abolitionists, and slaves either to fasten
the rope tighter or to loosen its grip. The complexities of its use cannot mask
its preeminence as a tool in the struggle over slavery and in the proper
location of governmental authority over this peculiarly evil institution.
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, even as pro-slave forces
more effectively used the federal writ to free slave traders from state custody,
the strength of the federal writ increased, upsetting the pro-state federalism
balance so important to the slave states. In playing its ancient part, the Great
Writ defined the boundaries of intragovernmental power.
The use of habeas corpus increased as the struggle for abolition
intensified. The westward expansion of our nation, with the accompanying
disputes over the character of the new territories, fueled passions
surrounding this great moral, economic, and political crisis. With the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, violence erupting in Kansas, and the Supreme
Court's decision in Dred Scott, the nation was faced with tragic choices.
Unable to reach a consensus, battles were waged with a variety of weapons.
Habeas corpus was used by both sides to define the boundaries of lawful
authority to declare a human slave free and to articulate the parameters of the
federal-state relationship.
Following the Civil War, the Republican-controlled Congress moved to
protect the freedmen. The Thirteenth Amendment was ratified and then
undermined by the explicitly racist Black Codes. The CRA was passed, only
to be weakened by modified Black Codes that used race-neutral language
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and took advantage of the Thirteenth Amendment's exception for criminal-
convict servitude. In response, Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment,
which constitutionalized the CRA and closed the Thirteenth Amendment's
loophole with a guarantee of federal habeas review. With the adoption of this
amendment, final determinations over race-based deprivations of liberty
were categorically removed from state control. States were forbidden to
abridge this privilege in any way. They could neither make a law that would
do so nor enforce one passed by Congress.
Sadly, but not surprisingly, under the banner of states' rights,
unrepentant slave owners and traders continued to resist lawful equality and
federal authority over the issue of slavery. Modem jurists and legislators,
tragically, have hoisted this same banner of federalism in a misguided and
unconstitutional campaign to revert to antebellum demarcations of power. In
doing so, they have offended not only the Privileges or Immunities Clause
but one of the most costly and hallowed principles this nation has ever
embraced.

